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The Death of Slander
Leslie Yalof Garfield*

Abstract. Technology killed slander. Slander, the tort of defamation by spoken
word, dates back to the ecclesiastical law of the Middle Ages and its determination
that damning someone‟s reputation in the village square was worthy of pecuniary
damage. Communication in the Twitter Age has torn asunder the traditional
notions of person-to-person communication. Text messaging, tweeting and other
new channels of personal exchange have led one of our oldest torts to its historic
demise.
At common law, slander was reserved for defamation by speech; libel was
actionable for the printed word. This distinction between libel and slander,
however, rests on a historical reality that is no longer accurate. Originally,
permanence and breadth of dissemination always coincided. Slander carried only
as far as one‟s voice. Because of slander‟s presumed evanescence, common law
required plaintiffs to plead special damages—proof of economic harm—in order to
recover for slander. The advent of broadcast technology, with its ability to amplify
the spoken word, challenged the traditional division of defamation and forced
courts and legislatures to reconsider old classifications. Jurisdictions split in their
decision to characterize broadcast speech as libel or slander, largely because of
divergent views about which aspect of the speech—permanence or breadth of
dissemination—was more important. Postbroadcast technology has further
complicated the defamation arena, leaving parties unsure of how best to plead their
defamation case.
In the past decade technology has again changed the way we communicate. The
digital communication revolution has created instances of widespread
dissemination through quick, nonreflective and often passing statements. This past
year, for example, Wael Ghonim‟s tweet to join him in an Egyptian village square
lead to the downfall of Egypt‟s political powers. His fleeting comments to those
willing to listen caused an entire nation to fall. This Article considers how courts
should rule when these tweets, or text messages, not quite printed, not quite spoken,
are defamatory.
This Article argues that the advent of text messaging, tweeting and other forms
of digital communication, which I call “technospeech,” renders the medieval tort
*
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of slander irrelevant in today‟s technological world. The article provides new
support for the contention that courts and legislatures should treat libel and
slander uniformly and should abolish the archaic requirement of proof of special
damages, a burden traditionally reserved for the spoken word. Maintaining
slander in the Twitter Age, with its requirement of proof of economic harm, vitiates
the common law purpose of defamation. Treating all defamation similarly
promotes fairness for plaintiffs seeking to rehabilitate their damaged reputation
and provides predictability to those bringing defamation claims. A thoughtful and
orderly treatment of technospeech mandates that courts and legislatures put the
proverbial final nail in the coffin of slander.
INTRODUCTION
Of all the odd pieces of bric-a-brac upon exhibition in the old curiosity shop of the
common law, surely one of the oddest is the distinction between the twin torts of libel
and slander.1

- William L. Prosser

Technology killed slander. Slander, the tort of defamation by spoken word,
dates back to the ecclesiastical courts of the middle ages, when damning someone‘s
reputation in the village square was worthy of pecuniary damage. 2 The advent of
tweeting, text messaging and blogging, however, has significantly encroached upon
the traditional notions of person-to-person communication.3 In light of these new
channels of personal exchange, judges, lawyers and legal theorists must
acknowledge that one of our oldest torts has met its historic demise. The manner in
which we speak to others and of others today demands new ways of regulation.
Ultimately, the Twitter Age has rendered slander irrelevant and, even more
importantly, necessitates a clear and easily provable form of defamation as a means
of combat against those who hide behind a screen rather than calling out their
comments in a public forum. 4 Consolidating slander and libel into the single tort
of defamation will, therefore, better serve those who have suffered the type of
1. William L. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REV. 839, 839 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser,
Libel Per Quod].
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 cmt. b (1977).
3. Alex Lickerman, The Effect of Technology on Relationships, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (June 8,
2010),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/happiness-in-world/201006/the-effect-technologyrelationships.
4. The ―Twitter Age‖ is meant to include current digital communication such as Twitter, SMS
text messaging and speech-to-text. Twitter is a free social networking site that allows users to send and
receive Tweets of up to 140 characters. The Tweets are posted on the author's Twitter site and are
forwarded to those who subscribe as followers. A subscriber's Twitter page can be made private, and
available only to followers, or can remain public and available to anyone on the Internet. See About
Twitter, TWITTER, http://wwww.twitter.com/about (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). For a discussion of SMS
text messaging, see infra notes 119–123 and accompanying text. For a discussion of speech-to-text, see
infra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.
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reputational damage that entitles them to a remedy at law.
Courts divide defamation—the tort of supplying false communication about
another in a way that results in pecuniary or emotional harm—into two categories:
libel and slander.5 Libel, written defamation, is actionable upon proof that the
defendant communicated false words in writing to a third party about one‘s
reputation and that those words resulted in harm. 6 Slander, spoken defamation,
requires proof of the same elements as libel plus, in some circumstances, special
damages—evidence that the spoken words yielded demonstrable economic harm to
the defamed individual.7 Courts impose this additional burden on those alleging
slander because spoken words are more transitory than written words, generally
reaching a smaller audience and lacking the durability of words that appear in
print.8
The libel/slander distinction is blurred when considered against the backdrop of
how we currently communicate. Many town hall meetings, including a recent
Presidential meeting, occur ―live‖ online.9 Rather than raising their hands from the
audience, people are encouraged to submit questions via Facebook and Twitter. 10
The classroom bully is no longer the biggest child in the sandbox, but rather the
elementary school student who is most adept at creating malignant blog posts.11
Coworkers forgo face to face communication, instead sending an e-mail, lessening
the time necessary to leave their desks. Text messaging, tweeting and blogging are
now more regularly replacing the face to face communications that so frequently
occurred during the time of slander‘s origin.
Defamatory text messages written on a phone screen are otherwise incapable of
widespread dissemination. Defamatory tweets posted on computers, quickly
disappear into cyberspace. These communications combine the presumed
evanescence of slander with the permanency of libel. Under contemporary
defamation law, jurisdictions are forced to characterize this type of communication
5. See Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225, 228 (1875) (―[T]here is a marked distinction between
slander and libel, and that many things are actionable when written or printed and published which
would not be actionable if merely spoken, without averring and proving special damage.‖). See also
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 372 (1974); Brewer v. Memphis Pub. Co., Inc., 626 F.2d
1238, 1245 (5th Cir. 1980); Moore v. Cox, 341 F. Supp. 2d 570, 574 (M.D.N.C. 2004); Emo v. Milbank
Mut. Ins. Co., 183 N.W.2d 508, 516 (N.D. 1971).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977).
7. Id. at § 633.
8. Angio-Medical Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 720 F. Supp. 269, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing Le
Massena v. Storm, 62 A.D. 150, 154 (N.Y. 1st Dep‘t 1901) (finding that plaintiff must show special
damages in a slander case). See also Hartmann v. Winchell, 73 N.E.2d 30, 32 (N.Y. 1974) (Fuld, J.,
concurring) (citing SALMOND‘S LAW OF TORTS 370 (W.T.S. Stallybrass, 10th ed., 1945)).
9. See Michael D. Shear, Obama Takes Questions from His Tweeps, N.Y. TIMES—THE CAUCUS
BLOG (July 6, 2011), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/06/obama-takes-questions-from-histweeps (Twitter users were allowed to submit 140 character questions to the President); Obama Goes
Online for Town Hall Meeting, CNN POLITICS (Mar. 26, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-0326/politics/obama.online_ 1_president-obama-questions-white-house?_s=PM:POLITICS.
10. See supra note 9.
11. See Jan Hoffman, As Bullies Go Digital, Parents Play Catch Up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/us/05bully.html?_r=1?_s=PM:POLITICS.

(2)

20

Garfield Death of Slander

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

1/13/2012 5:06 PM

[35:1

as slander, thereby requiring a plaintiff to prove special damages, or as libel, which
relieves a plaintiff of proving economic harm. 12 This hybrid nature of digital
communication calls into question the rational for maintaining the libel/slander
distinction.
Scholars and commentators, recognizing the illogic in the libel/slander
distinction, regularly write that the distinction is archaic and therefore should be
abolished.13 Some claim that the reason for consolidation is that the lines between
libel and slander have become sufficiently blurred so as to make proving either
confusing to parties and courts.14 Other commentators argue that the distinction
between libel and slander is artificial and that the ―intricate and elaborate doctrinal
structure is difficult for ordinary lawyers and judges to penetrate, leading to
muddled strategies and confused decisions.‖ 15 Critics abroad also support the
abolition of the semantic distinction.16 A committee of leading English judges

12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 cmt. b (1977) (stating that special damages must be
proven unless defamatory speech falls within recognized categories of slander per while libel is
actionable per se).
13. See, e.g., 1 Rodney A. Smolla, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:28 (2d ed. 1991); Reed R. Callister,
Defamation: Elimination of Distinction between Libel and Slander as to the Showing of Special
Damages, 33 S. CAL. L. REV. 104 (1959); Laurence W. Eldredge, The Spurious Role of Libel Per Quod,
79 HARV. L. REV. 733 (1966) [hereinafter Eldredge, Spurious Role of Libel Per Quod]; Julie C. Sipe,
―Old Stinking, Old Nasty, Old Itchy Old Toad”: Defamation Law, Warts and All (A Call for Reform),
41 IND. L. REV. 137 (2008). See also Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law
Through Uniform Legislation: The Search for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. REV. 291 (1994)
(summarizing various tort reforms); Randall P. Bezanson, Legislative Reform and Libel Law, 10 COMM.
LAW. 1 (1992) (commenting on the proposed Defamation Act, sponsored by the Libel Defense Resource
Center, which suggested unification of Libel and Slander). But see Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects:
The Communications Decency Act and the Online Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 142
(2008) (―The distinction between slander and libel remains important in American courts today.‖).
14. See Richard J. Conviser & Roger W. Meslar, Obsolete on its Face: Libel Per Quod Rule, 45
ARK. L. REV. 1, 12, 26–27 (1992); Jay Framson, The First Cut is the Deepest, but the Second May be
Actionable: Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. and the Incremental Harm Doctrine, 25 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1483, 1503 (1992); Mike Steenson, Defamation Per Se: Defamation by Mistake?, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 779, 794 (2000) (―The troublesome aspect of the opinion, however, is the potential
for confusion that results from a mix of slander and libel principles that could permit the conclusion in
subsequent cases that ‗defamation per se‘ means only defamation that falls into the categories of slander
per se, irrespective of whether the plaintiff's claim is for libel or slander.‖).
15. David A. Anders, Rethinking Defamation, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1047, 1057 (2006). In 1988, the
Libel Reform Project of the Annenberg Washington Program in Communications Policy released the
Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal, a comprehensive model statute with accompanying commentary.
The proposal was a response to widespread recognition that current libel law was ―costly [and]
cumbersome,‖ and failed to achieve the twin goals of defamation to protect the first amendment while
allowing one to defend his or her reputation. Although it received widespread national attention, the
proposal was never adopted. See Rodney A. Smolla & Michael J. Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel
Reform Project, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 25, 25–26, 31 (1989). Professor Laurence Eldredge
advocates that all of libel and slander should fall under the general definition of defamation. See
Eldredge, Spurious Role of Libel Per Quod, supra note 13.
16. See, e.g., Defamation Act of 2005 (NSW) divs 1, 2 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/da200599/. See also Kevin F. Crombie, Scots Law
Defamation on the Internet: A Consideration of New Issues, Problems and Solutions for Scots Law, 1
SCOTS
LAW
STUDENT
JOURNAL
38–39
(Oct.
2000)
(Scot.),
available
at
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advised Parliament on certain methods of reforming the law of defamation. Among
other things, they recommended the abolition of the distinction in form, ―which
rests upon no solid foundation.‖17
This Article agrees with scholars and commentators that the slander/libel
distinction should be abolished, but rests its argument on very different grounds.
Current technological methods of communication, which combine the hallmarks of
slander and libel, render the common law distinction between the two torts, ―harsh
and unjust.‖18 These distinctions ―bear no relevance to the technological methods
of communication today.‖19 Contemporary digital communication renders the
common law distinction between libel and slander obsolete.
This Article presents its findings in three parts. Part I explains the origins of
defamation, slander and libel and illustrates the gradual shift that courts have made,
from classifying all spoken words as slander to viewing certain types of speech as
libel. This section will highlight the judicial responses to communication that
occurs in media other than print. Part II will consider the way in which we
communicate today, including an exploration of the lexicon that defines speech
through technology. Part II illustrates that many of us today engage in what I call
―technospeech‖—a tangible and printable form of dialogue. Part II then considers
the legal implications of defamatory technsopeech, highlighting the current trend
among courts to dredge up ancient tort principles to respond to modern day
technological advances. In most instances, the historic relevance of the particular
wrong is far too narrow to provide an appropriate remedy. The Article will then
offer evidence that reliance on the judicial system to continue to distinguish
between libel and slander is inefficient and time consuming, and then will
demonstrate how, in every instance, a court is likely to label text messaging and
tweeting as libel.
Part III of this Article will advocate a normative approach to abolishing the tort
of slander based on the increasing prevalence of technospeech today. This
illustrates that the theoretical reasons for slander are no longer supported in light of
today‘s digital communications. The Section first shows how technospeech renders
slander historically irrelevant. Second, this Section highlights how contemporary
methods of communication dilute the presence of slander in American
jurisprudence, leaving little justification for maintaining a subtort that causes
confusion to parties and courts. Third, this Section points to a trend over the past
several centuries, which has been moving away from defamation‘s original purpose
of providing a mechanism for rehabilitating one‘s reputation, and suggests that
communication in the Twitter Age can serve as a vehicle to lead us back to
www.scottishlaw.org.uk/journal/oct2000/def.pdf (America has a different approach to defamation law.
In fact, even England draws a distinction between publication and communication, which Scots courts
do not.).
17. Charles E. Carpenter, Libel Per Se in California and Some Other States, 17 S. Cal. L. Rev.
347, 350 (1943–44) (citing Restatement (First) of Torts § 568 cmt. b (1938)).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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defamation‘s primary objective.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF DEFAMATION
Many things can be said with impunity by word of mouth but not so when it is caught
on the wind and transmitted in to print. What gives the sting to the writing is its
permanence of form. The spoken word dissolves, but the written one abides, and
perpetuates the scandal. 20

- Justice Cardozo
A. DEFAMATION DEFINED: THE LIBEL/SLANDER DISTINCTION
Many have commented (though not often as eloquently as Justice Cardozo) on
the distinction between libel and slander.21 But before one considers what has
become a bit of a semantic divide, one must first recognize what the two tort
theories have in common, for both are forms of defamation. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts defines defamation as ―a false and defamatory statement
concerning another.‖22 The tort provides a remedy for those who suffer
reputational or emotional damage from a third party communication. 23 At its core,
a communication is defamatory ―if it tends to so harm the reputation of another as
to lower him or her in the estimation of the community or to deter a third person
from associating or dealing with him [or her].‖ 24

20. Ostrowe v. Lee, 175 N.E. 505, 506 (N.Y. 1931).
21. See, e.g., Shor v. Billingsley, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476, 482 (App. Div. 1957) (―One reason often
given for the distinction is that a libel written and published shows more deliberate malignity than a
mere oral slander.‖ (quoting RICHARD O‘SULLIVAN, GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER IN A CIVIL
ACTION: WITH PRECEDENTS OF PLEADINGS 4–5 (4th ed. 1953)); ―Written slander is premeditated and
shows design.‖ (quoting Clement v. Chivis, 9 B. & C. 174 (E.C.L.)); ―Another reason is that a greater
degree of mischief is probable in the case of a libel, owing to its more durable character, and the fact that
it can be more easily disseminated.‖ Additionally, ―[a] person who publishes defamatory matter on
paper or in print puts into circulation that which is more permanent and more easily transmissible than
oral slander.‖ (quoting Ratcliffe v. Evans, 2 Q.B. 524, 530 (1892))).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
23. See Fisher v. Lynch, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1233 (D. Kan. 2008); Longbehn v. Schoenrock,
727 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Minn. App. 2007).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 559 (1977). In order to be actionable, the communication
must be ―(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a
third party; (c) [made with] fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher;‖ and ―(d)
[the cause of] either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special
harm . . . .‖ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 558 (1977). See also Kimber v. Bancroft, No.
CV010455708S, 2004 WL 1615972, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 25, 2004) (holding that calling a
clergyman a ―poverty pimp for hire‖ constituted defamation as it reflected unfavorably upon the
clergyman‘s personal morality and integrity). Many scholars have paid significant attention to the postInternet boom meaning of reputation. See David S. Ardia, Defamation and Reputation in a Networked
World,
45
HARV.
C.R.-C.L.
L.
REV
261
(2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1689865. The Internet‘s constant availability of
information from an increasing number of diverse and frequent sources makes reputations more
transient and easily challenged. See generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation and the
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Historically, courts divide instances of defamation into libel and slander. 25 As
Justice Cardozo emphasized, the difference between actions for slander and libel is
predicated on the notion that the former is often evanescent; it is spoken, fleeting,
soon forgotten and therefore less likely to permanently injure. 26 The latter is more
contemplative and therefore more ―deliberate and malicious, more capable of
circulation in distant places, and consequently more likely to be permanently
injurious.‖27 As a result, a plaintiff is not required to prove direct financial harm in
order to recover for libel.28 Upon proof of written defamation, it is assumed that
damages have occurred.29 In contrast, slander requires the plaintiff to prove actual
harm.30
Thus, what distinguishes libel and slander first and foremost—other than the
means of communication—is the additional requirement that where slander is
concerned, a plaintiff cannot prevail absent proof of special damages. 31 For both
libel and slander, proof that a false statement damaged plaintiff‘s reputation in the
community will suffice.32 If the statement is published, the plaintiff, upon proof of
these elements, will recover general damages. 33
The requirement of proof of special damages is relaxed when the alleged

Myth of Community, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1996); Amy Sanders, Defining Defamation: Community
in the Age of the Internet, 15 Comm. L. Pol‘y 231, 261–62 (2010), available at
http://www.britannica.com/bps/additionalcontents/18/52038255/Defining-Defamation-Community-inthe-Age-of-the-internet (noting that online chat groups, blogs and social media websites, such as
Facebook and MySpace, have bloated the boundaries of a shared community beyond the village green to
States, if not Continents). While proof of reputation and community are essential to a claim, their
definition is not fundamental to the essence of my argument, as these elements are necessary whether
proving libel or slander.
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 cmt. b (1977).
26. See Ostrowe, 175 N.E. at 506.
27. Tonini v. Cevasco, 46 P. 103, 104 (1896). See also Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225, 235 (1876)
(―Slander, in writing or in print, says the commentator, has always been considered in our law a graver
and more serious wrong and injury than slander by word of the mouth, inasmuch as it is accompanied by
greater coolness and deliberation, indicates greater malice, and is in general propagated wider and
farther than oral slander.‖); Rice v. Simmons, 2 Del. 417, 418 (1838) (finding that libel is more
permanent, deliberate and extensive); Fonville v. M‘Nease, 23 S.C.L. (Dud.) 303, 310 (1838) (―Words
are evanescent; they are as fleeting as the perishing flowers of spring; they are often the results of mere
passion; but written slander is to remain; it is to be treasured up by every other malicious man for his
day of vengeance . . . .‖).
28. See W.J.A v. D.A., 4 A.3d 601, 605–06 (N.J. Super. 2010) (―noting that . . . pecuniary]
damages were to be presumed for libel as early as 1670.‖ (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 568
cmt. b (1938))).
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, 708 F. Supp. 2d 874, 886 (D. Minn. 2010)
(determining that slander is not actionable absent proof of special damages or proof that words were
slander per se); Long v. Vertical Techs., Inc., 439 S.E.2d 797, 800 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (prohibiting
plaintiff from recovering absent proof of special damages).
31. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
32. Wilson v. Meyer, 126 P.3d 276, 279 (Colo. 2005) (citing Tonnessen v. Denver Publ‘g Co., 5
P.3d 959, 963 (Colo. App. 2000)).
33. See Pollard, 91 U.S. at 235.
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defamation constitutes slander per se.34 Early common law courts have labeled
four types of statements as so clearly injurious to one‘s reputation that they could
be presumed slanderous even without any proof of special damages. 35 These types
are as follows: (1) statements that challenge plaintiff‘s competence in his or her
trade or profession, (2) statements claiming the plaintiff has a loathsome disease,
(3) statements alleging serious criminal misbehavior by the plaintiff, and (4)
suggestions of a lack of chastity in a woman. 36
Over the past century, a trend has emerged revealing an increase in slander per
se cases, thereby relieving the plaintiff of the obligation to prove special damages. 37
Most slander cases are brought against those accusing the plaintiff of bad business
dealings, improper sexual conduct or criminal activity. 38 There is little left that is
not slander per se, although plagiarism cases have been among the few slander
cases in which the plaintiff was actually required to prove special damages. 39
Courts have so significantly fractionalized defamation that it is best to think of
the various forms of defamation as subtorts. 40 By the mid Seventeenth century,
courts already recognized three defamatory subtorts: libel, slander and slander per
se.41 The early 1900s brought further fractionalization and consequently more
defamatory subtorts when some jurisdictions divided libel into two types: libel per

34.
35.
36.
37.

Ransopher v. Chapman, 791 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Ark. 1990).
Biondi v. Nassimos, 692 A.2d 103, 106 (N.J. Super. 1997).
Id. at 154 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 570–74 (1977)).
Original research conducted through WESTLAWNEXT.

TRIAL COURT ORDERS
1900–1910
Slander Per Se
6

1940–1950
4

1990–2000
83

2000–2010
38

% of defamation trial court orders that were slander per se
1900–1910
1940–1950
1990–2000
Slander Per Se
5%
2%
11%

2000–2010
18%

CASES
1940–1950
21

1990–2000
579

2000–2010
1,118

% of defamation cases that were slander per se
1900–1910
1940–1950
Slander Per Se
1.7%
1.4%

1990–2000
31.5%

2000–2010
37%

Slander Per Se

1900–1910
20

See also David Anderson, Rethinking Defamation, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1047, 1054 (2006) (―In the past
quarter-century, on average fewer than 20 libel cases against media have gone to trial per year in the
entire United States.‖).
38. Original research conducted through WESTLAWNEXT.
39. See generally Tacka v. Georgetown Univ., 193 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2001).
40. The analogy is similar to William Prosser's four subtorts of privacy. See William L. Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
41. See Ardia, supra note 24, at 284.
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se and libel per quod.42 The creation of these subtorts was prompted by court
concern that there was a distinction between statements that were libelous on their
face and those that required extrinsic evidence to prove inducement or innuendo;
this ultimately led courts to divide libel into two categories. 43 Libel per se was
reserved for the statements that were defamatory on their face. 44
In contrast, libel per quod applied to instances where the statement required
evidence of innuendo to prove it was defamatory. 45 The notion behind libel per
quod, therefore, was similar to that of pure slander; since there was potential for
minimal harm, if none at all, by a particular statement, defendants should not be
called to answer for their statement unless the plaintiff was able to prove that the
statement caused pecuniary harm.46 Most recently, Georgia courts created an
additional subtort, ―defamacast,‖ which alleviated a plaintiff from proving special
damages for any type of broadcast defamation. 47
With an appreciation for the various sub-torts and the difference in pleading
requirements of the various forms of libel and slander, it is important to understand
the historical evolution of the two torts and the way in which the law has navigated
and shepherded each in the face of technological advances. 48
B. THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCT OF LIBEL AND SLANDER IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL
ERA
The distinction between libel and slander is a historic anomaly and really just an
archaic remnant of ecclesiastical law. 49 The ecclesiastical courts, which united the
law with religion and morals, sharply prohibited the publication of false reports
affecting the character of others.50 Although there was no formal punishment for
42. See Oliveros v. Henderson, 106 S.E. 855, 857 (1921) (one of the earliest cases acknowledging
the libel slander distinction); Eldredge, Spurious Role of Libel Per Quod, supra note 13, at 734 (quoting
Dean Prosser) (noting a trend among American courts to require special damages for libel that depends
on proof of extrinsic facts (libel per quod)). See generally Prosser, Libel Per Quod, supra note 1
(American Courts have adopted the libel per se/libel per quod distinction).
43. Id.
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 rep. note 2 (1977).
45. Id. Morrison v. Ritchie & Co, 4 F. 645, 645–46 (Scot. 1902), is often cited as a strong
example of libel per quod. In that case, defendant newspaper published reports that the plaintiff had
given birth to twins. On its face, the statement was not damaging to the plaintiff‘s reputation. However,
the community knew that the plaintiff was not married, which made the statement defamatory.
46. See, e.g., Morton v. Hearst Corp., 779 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1989).
47. See Jailett v. Ga. Television Co., 520 S.E.2d 721, 724 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (defining
―Defamacast‖ as ―[d]efamation via a radio or television broadcast . . . .‖); Am. Broad.-Paramount
Theatres v. Simpson, 126 S.E.2d 873, 878 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-10
(2011) (setting forth the Georgia statute governing civil liability for defamatory statements in visual or
sound broadcasts).
48. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (defining pure slander as slander that requires proof
of special damages).
49. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 cmt. b (1977).
50. See Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind the
Cart, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 3, 41 (1985). See generally MARTIN L. NEWELL, THE LAW OF SLANDER AND
LIBEL IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES (Mason H. Newell ed., 4th ed. 1924) (discussing the origins of
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verbal dissemination of an untruth, the wronged party was entitled to avenge
himself against the person speaking the wrong.51 The lack of technology meant
that defamation during the Middle Ages was almost exclusively committed by the
spoken word.52 These wrongful falsities the ecclesiastical courts had come to
embrace were labeled as slander.53 Eventually, the common law courts absorbed
ecclesiastical law, due in part to the ecclesiastical courts‘ inability to provide an
adequate remedy for those seeking relief, and the offense became a common law
misdemeanor and a tort.54
As printing presses became more commonplace, the limited nature of slander,
still reserved for the spoken word, seemed ―wholly inadequate‖ for the times. 55
The Star Chamber exercised its mandate to ensure fair treatment of prominent
people by regulating dissemination of the printed word. 56 The Star Chamber
classified written falsities as libel, considering them both a tort and a crime. 57 The
ecclesiastical courts, however, retained jurisdiction over slander.58
Subsequent courts did not challenge this division and instead treated the two
types of defamation as separate torts.59 Lord Hale supported the divide, writing
that written and published words can contain more malice than if they had only

defamation law).
51. See MARTIN L. NEWELL, THE LAW OF SLANDER AND LIBEL IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES
97–98 (Mason H. Newell ed., 3d ed. 1914) (―[E]very act whatsoever of man that causes damage to
another obliges him by whose fault it happened, to repair it . . . ‖).
52. Id. According to Stat. 2 Richard II stat.1 ch. 5, ―devisers of false news and of horrible and
false lies‖ have committed an act of ―great slander.‖ See NEWELL, supra note 51, at 21-22. Richard II
ruled from 1377 to 1399. See generally CHRISTOPHER FLETCHER, RICHARD II: MANHOOD, YOUTH,
AND POLITICS (2008) (discussing the monarch's reign). Richard II of England codified the law as
slander, meaning to devise ―false news and horrible and false lies.‖ See Newell, supra note 51, at 21–
22.
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 568 cmt. b (1977) (noting that some types of slander
remained in the ecclesiastical courts; they were the classes of slander that the common law courts found
it possible by fictions or other expedients to wrest from ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The result was
simply that certain types of slander, having certain characteristics and consequences, came within
common law jurisdiction, while the remaining types stayed within ecclesiastical jurisdictions).
54. See Bonnie Docherty, Defamation Law: Positive Jurisprudence, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 263,
265 (2000) (citing KENNETH CAMPBELL, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A PHILOSOPHY FOR THE
PROTECTION OF OPINION IN DEFAMATION LAW 39 (1990) (observing that church courts could only offer
remedies of apology). See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 568 cmt. b (1938).
55. Id. (quoting Lord Hale, ―Although such general words spoken once without writing or
publishing them would not be actionable, yet here, they being writ and published, which contains more
malice than if they had been once spoken, they are actionable.‖). See also Whitmore v. Kansas City Star
Co., 499 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Mo. App. 1973) (―Slander since the time of Adam and Eve, together with libel
since Johann Gutenberg invested the printing press, have met in head on confrontation with mankind's
inherent belief in freedom of oral and written expression.‖).
56. Id. The Star Chamber was the court of equity, charged with administering criminal justice. In
the Seventeenth Century, the Star Chamber heard crimes of political libel as a means of protecting the
government‘s power from the printing press. For example, the Star Chamber assumed jurisdiction over
libel in the interest of public harmony.
57. Id. Because libel tended to breach the peace, it was considered a crime at common law.
58. See id.
59. Id.
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been spoken once.60 By 1812, the notion of treating spoken and written words
differently seemed fairly well settled on the grounds that the doctrine was too wellestablished to be repudiated.61
The popularization and proliferation of radio and television media outlets forced
courts to reconsider whether all spoken defamatory words should be slander. 62 The
advent of radio technology meant that, for the first time, spoken words could be
heard in areas far beyond where they were uttered. Moreover, the prestige of
broadcast radio had the effect of lending credibility to the information conveyed. 63
The effect of technology on defamation law first gained prominent attention in
Hartman v. Winchell, which involved famed radio gossip personality Walter
Winchell.64 The New York Court of Appeals concluded that spoken words read
from a written script over the radio constituted libel and not slander. 65 One
member of the Court found support for the Court‘s decision ―because of the
likelihood of aggravated injury inherent in such broadcasting.‖ 66
Shor v. Billingsley was a more difficult case. 67 It considered an ad libbed radio
comment made by radio talk show host Billingsley about Toots Shor, the owner of
the famed Stork Club.68 The controversy centered on a discussion between two
radio talk show hosts, Brisson and Billingsly; the discussion was broadcast live
from the restaurant belonging to famed restaurateur Toots Shor.69 As Shor walked
by, Billingsley commented that he ―wished he had as much money as [Shor]
owes.‖70 Shor brought a lawsuit pleading defamation, libel and slander. 71 The
defense moved to dismiss the claim, based on the failure to prove special damages,

60. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 568 cmt. b (1938) (quoting Lord Hale, who said, ―[A]
lthough such general words spoken once without writing or publishing them would not be actionable,
yet here, they being writ and published, which contains more malice than if they had been once spoken,
they are actionable.‖)
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., Shor v. Billingsley, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476, 479 (App. Div. 1957) (noting that
defamatory material published via a televised broadcast was a case of first impression).
63. See Ciolli, supra note 13, at 144.
64. Hartman v. Winchell, 73 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1947).
65. Id. at 32.
66. Id. at 32 (Fuld, J., concurring).
67. Shor, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The full discussion went as follows:
Mr. Brisson: That is Toots Shor and a man I don't know.
Mr. Billingsley: You want to know something?
Mr. Brisson: Want to know something? I saw Toots Shor, he's a good-looking fellow,
isn't he?
Mr. Billingsley: Yes, he is. Want to know something? I wish I had as much money as
he owes.
Mr. Brisson: Owes you or somebody else?
Mr. Billingsley: Everybody-oh, a lot of people.
Id. at 478.
71. See id. at 476.
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which is the element required for slander, but not libel. 72 The New York Supreme
Court, acknowledging that this was a case of first impression, distinguished it from
Hartman, which was based on words spoken from a written script. 73
The Court in Billingsley highlighted arguments for and against changing the
well-settled and historic distinction between libel and slander.74 Here the Court
first acknowledged the two distinguishing hallmarks of libel: widespread
dissemination and its permanency in form, both of which create a likelihood of
aggravated injury.75 With regard to widespread dissemination, the Court cited
numerous opinions and treatises that supported the contention that broadcasting
reaches a ―vast and far flung‖ audience. 76 While the Court acknowledged the same
lack of durability that broadcast media has, it ultimately sided with the plaintiff,
holding that the equally great potential for harm that accompanied broadcast
journalism outweighed the measure of permanence. 77
Justice Hecht, who wrote for the Court, acknowledged that technology nudged
the doctrinal principle of defamation law across an otherwise steadfast divide. 78
Cardozo‘s opinion in Winchell, he wrote, recognized the duty of the Court to
extend established principles of law to new technological advances, even when not
covered by the literal language of previous decisions. 79 Justice Hecht believed that
the genius of the common law was that it could meet any challenge posed by the
―needs of life in a developing civilization.‖ 80
Reporters of the Restatement (Second) Section 568A subsequently adopted the
Shor holding.81 Many legislatures followed suit and today the issue is regulated
mostly by statute.82 Many jurisdictions, including California and Ohio, rejected
Shor and instead labeled defamation by broadcast media as slander.83 Other
jurisdictions took an intermediary approach, deeming broadcasted defamatory
speech as libel when it emanates from a script, and slander if comments stem from
72. Id.
73. Id. at 486–89.
74. Id. at 476–80.
75. Id. at 481.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 484.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Sorensen v. Wood, 243 N.W. 82, 85 (Neb. 1932). See generally Charles Parker Co. v.
Silver City Crystal Co., 116 A.2d 440, 443 (Conn. 1955); Weglein v. Golder, 177 A. 47, 48 (Pa. 1935).
82. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ‘S TORTS CASES AND
MATERIALS 888 (12th ed. 2010).
83. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(1) (West 2001) (defining radio broadcasts as slander). See also
Brothers v. Cnty. of Summit, No. 5:03CV1002, 2007 WL 1567662, at *26 (N.D. Ohio May 25, 2007);
Metcalf v. KFOR-TV, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1515, 1525 (W.D. Okla. 1992) (applying Oklahoma law where
defendant broadcast television station has broadcast a slanderous statement); Total Exposure.com, Ltd.
v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., No. 20162, 2006 WL 267151 (Ohio App. 2d Feb. 3, 2006); Bacon
v. Kirk, No. 1-99-33, 2000 WL 1648925 (Ohio App. 3d Oct. 31, 2000); Schulman v. Embrescia
Communications Corp., No. 52280, 1981 WL 4650 (Ohio App. 8d. Nov. 25, 1981). See also Chart infra
pp. 52–55.
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ad libbed discussion.84 The law regarding the treatment of defamatory broadcast
speech remains inconsistent today.85
American courts have taken a more normative approach to classifying
defamatory speech on the Internet. As a general rule, Internet postings that injure
one‘s reputation are libel, in large part because they appear in print on computer
screens.86 Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, one of the first cases to
consider how Internet communication should be treated, illustrates the competing
arguments and presents a resolve that appears to satiate all jurisdictions.87
Defendants Michelangelo Delfino and Mary Day posted thousands of negative
comments on websites and message boards criticizing their employer, Varian
Medical Systems (VMS). 88 VMS sued the defendants for libel.89 Predictably, the
defendants answered that Internet postings should be characterized as slander rather
than libel, which would require plaintiffs to meet the extra burden of proving
special damages.90 They based their argument on an interpretation of California
law, which defines slander as defamatory communications that are ―orally uttered,
and also communications by radio or any mechanical or other means.‖ 91 The
defendants noted that the statute covers television, even though television is not
specifically cited, and should therefore also cover the Internet by analogy. 92
Furthermore, they argued, because Internet postings can easily be deleted, modified
or even lost in cyberspace, they do not possess the durability of traditional print. 93
The California Appellate Court, in 2005, ruled that Internet postings were
considered libel, not slander, under California law. 94 It stated that Internet posts are
representations ―to the eye.‖95 Although they may be easily deleted and modified,
the Court concluded that posts are much more fixed than the spoken word.96
Furthermore, the Court held that individuals could preserve messages just by
printing them.97 In short, the Court wrote, ―the only difference between the
publications the defendants made in this case and traditionally libelous publications

84. See, e.g., Neely v. Wilson, 331 S.W.3d 900, 912 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011).
85. See Chart infra pp. 52–55.
86. See David Watson, C.A.: Defamatory Internet Postings Libel, Not Slander, METROPOLITAN
NEWS-ENTERPRISE (Nov. 14, 2003), http://www.metnews.com/articles/vari111403.htm.
87. Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325 (Ct. App. 2003), rev‟d, 106 P.3d 958
(Cal. 2005) (noting that internet postings are classified as libel).
88. Varian Med. Sys., Inc., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 333.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. CAL. CIV. CODE § 46 (West 2011).
92. Varian Med. Sys. Inc., 6 Cal. Rptr 3d at 342.
93. Id. at 343.
94. Varian Med. Sys., Inc., 106 P.3d at 963 (noting that in California an appellate court generally
does not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal; the Court held that, in this instance, it was
necessary to do so, as it was a matter of public interest). Id.
95. Varian Med. Sys. Inc., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 341, 343.
96. Id. at 343.
97. Id.
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is the defendants‘ choice to disseminate the writings electronically.‖ 98
In Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, the plaintiff contended that a defamatory
Internet posting should be labeled slander, which would absolve it of the
requirement of proving special damages. 99 The Court disagreed.100 In rendering its
decision, the Court concluded that the ―wide area of dissemination, [and] the fact
that a record of the publication is made with some substantial degree of
permanence‖ render it libel.101 The Court went on to conclude that defamatory
Internet postings should be treated as libel. 102 All American jurisdictions seem to
have followed suit.103
England takes a different approach. In 2008, an English High Court judge ruled
that Internet bulletin boards are more like slander than libel. 104 The Court‘s
reasoning was that bulletin board discussions are characterized by ―give and take‖
and should be considered more in that context. 105 The judge noted the casual
conversational nature of bulletin board posts, finding that, unlike newspaper
articles, such posts are often ill thought out.106 ―When considered in the context of
defamation law, therefore, communications of this kind are much more akin to
slanders than to the usual, more permanent kind of communications found in libel
actions.‖107
Notwithstanding the seeming consistency with which courts have treated
defamatory Internet speech, the interstate discrepancy with which defamatory
broadcast statements are treated and the international inconsistency of defamatory
Internet speech, portend a future of confusion as new technological communication
advances emerge. The next section of this Paper will highlight some of the newest
98. Id. Another significant issue in the Varian case was the interpretation of California‘s SLAPP
statute. A SLAPP statute, a strategic lawsuit against public participation, threatens or financially
burdens a defendant with costly litigation, forcing the defendant to cease and desist from his or her
actions. In this case, defendant‘s Delfino and Day filed a motion to strike Varian‘s complaint under
California‘s anti-SLAPP statute. The matter in controversy concerned whether filing an anti-SLAPP
motion affected an automatic stay of the trial proceedings. The Court answered in the affirmative.
99. Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 993 A.2d 845, 862 (N.J. Super. 2010), aff'd and modified,
206 N.J. 209 (2011).
100. Id. at 864 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977) (demonstrating the
rationale for extending the pre-Internet age definition of slander to postings)).
101. Id. at 864–65. See also W.J.A. v. D.A., 4 A.3d. 601, 604 (N.J. Super. 2010).
102. Too Much Media, LLC, 993 A.2d at 864.
103. See, e.g., Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 944 So. 2d 460, 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(defaming statements in a newsletter disseminated over the Internet can constitute libel); Rizitelli v.
Thompson, No. CV95009384S, 2010 WL 3341516, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2010) (mentioning
the complaint, which alleged that defamatory statements on a blog constituted libel per se/per quod);
Lawrence v. Walker, 9 Pa. D. & C. 5th 225, 243 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2009) (defaming statements posted on an
Internet forum can constitute libel).
104. Smith v. ADVFN Plc & Ors, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1797 (Eng.).
105. Id. (comparing conversations on blogs to those in bars where passersby simply note the
dialogue before moving on).
106. Id.
107. Id. (―People do not often take a 'thread' and go through it as a whole like a newspaper article.
They tend to read the remarks, make their own contributions if they feel inclined, and think no more
about it.‖)

(2)

Garfield Death of Slander

2011]

THE DEATH OF SLANDER

1/13/2012 5:06 PM

31

advances in technological communication and will illustrate how many of these
advances allow us to communicate in a sort of hybrid speech, combining the
evanescent and fleeting qualities of the spoken word and the permanency of the
written form. These new hybrid methods of communication pose challenges
similar to those posed by the printing press and then by broadcast airwaves—
neither of whose forms were contemplated at the time slander originated.
II. REAL-TIME DIGITAL COMMUNICATION
Speech has become a sort of hybrid communication, combining the off the cuff
discussion that frequently occurs through oral discourse with printable qualities of
electronic text.
Today, whole conversations are communicated through
technological media rather than through actual face to face speech. Discussions
occur via instant messaging or text messaging. 108 Individuals often share
immediate thoughts and emotions without rethinking or editing their words. 109 For
many, text messaging and tweeting are acts that occur as easily as speaking in real
time. The result is a tangible and printable form of dialogue, which I term
technospeech.110 The following Section will more fully define technospeech and
will consider how technospeech is conducted in a similar manner as the type of
casual, and sometimes even reckless, face to face speech that slander contemplates.
A. DEFINING TECHNOSPEECH
Technospeech is communication that (1) occurs in real time, (2) is intended for a
particular group of people who know the speaker or at least have some kind of
social connection with the speaker and (3) is conducted in an informal manner..
Our contemporary world is replete with examples of technospeech. For example,
Twitter now replaces the bullhorn as a means to incite social change. 111 The text
108. Adam Fendelman, Definition of SMS Text Messaging: What is SMS Messaging? What is Text
Messaging?,
ABOUT.COM,
http://cellphones.about.com/od/phoneglossary/g/smstextmessage.htm
(explaining that text messages, also called short messaging service (SMS), are a communication that
allows the exchange of short messages (160 characters) between mobile phone devices); Mark Milian,
Why Text Messages are Limited to 160 Characters, L.A. TIMES (May 3, 2009, 1:28 PM), http://latimes
blogs.latimes.com/technology/2009/05/invented-text-messaging.html (tracking the development and
success of text messaging using a limited number of characters). See also Jack Cafferty, Technology
Replacing Personal Interactions at What Cost?, CAFFERTY FILE CNN.COM BLOGS (Jan. 3, 2011, 6:00
PM), http://caffertyfile.blogs.cnn.com/2011/01/03/technology-replacing-personal-interactions-at-whatcost/.
109. E.J. Westlake, Friend Me if You Facebook: Generation Y and Performative Surveillance, 52
THE DRAMA REV. 4, 26 (2008) (discussing the mid century French theorist Roland Barthes‘s distinction
between ―readerly text‖—text that is reflective and contemplated—and ―writerly text,‖ which is a
reflection of ―ourselves writing‖).
110. See generally DAVID CRYSTAL, LANGUAGE AND THE INTERNET 94–128 (Cambridge Press,
2001); David Crystal, 2b or Not 2b, THE GUARDIAN (DAILY), July 5, 2008, Review, at 2 (noting that
text messaging has also been called ―slanguage,‖ and ―textese‖).
111. Twitter, Inc., COMPANY PROFILE FROM HOOVER‘S, http://www.hoovers.com/company/
Twitter_Inc/rjfkhji-1.html (describing Twitter as a free social networking site, that allows a user to send
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messaging that follows from ownership of cell phones and Personal Digital
Assistants (PDAs) have come to replace face to face communication.112 Instant
messages now serve as common means for making social plans and even ending
social relationships.113 The new dynamic of communication—which is thoughtless
and off the cuff, yet visible to the eye because it is in digital from—combines the
fleeting and evanescent nature of slander with the permanency of libel. Consider
the following examples of technospeech:
Twitter replaces bullhorns. In early January 2011, activists in Egypt called for
an uprising to protest the government and rule of President Hosni Mubarak, when
Wael Ghonim, an Egyptian Google executive, used social media to ensure
significant attendance at an anti Mubarak rally.114 On January 24, Ghonim
tweeted: ―Despite all the warnings I got from my relatives and friends, I‘ll be there
on #Jan25 protests, Anyone going to be in Gam‘et Dewal protests?‖115 A later
tweet made the following instruction: ―Everyone come to Dar El Jekma security
police allow people to join us and we are a few hundreds #Jan25.‖116 Ghonim not
only called others to arms but also solicited advice through his tweets, as in the
following examples: ―How many people in Muhandseen without rumors please,‖
and, ―we want to move to Dar el Hekma where to go #Jan25.‖117 Ghonim‘s tweets
created an eighteen day national revolution that lead to the overthrow of Egypt‘s
longstanding government.118 His informal technospeech pleas and call to arms
hearkened back to the successful leadership of the demise of Egypt‘s long-ruling
government. Ghonim‘s activities illustrate the ease with which people can
assemble and communicate through the Internet.

and receive Tweets of up to 140 characters—whether banal or insightful—which are posted on the
author‘s Twitter site for others to see). See also About Twitter, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last
visited Oct. 23, 2011).
112. See Mike Sachoff, Teen Texting Sees Sharp Increase, WEB PRO NEWS (April 20, 2009, 5:09
PM), http://www.webpronews.com/teen-texting-sees-sharp-increase-2010-04. See generally Crystal,
supra note 110. See also Cell Phones: A Tool for Cheating, UNIV. OF ALA. COMPUTERS AND APPLIED
TECH. PROGRAM (2006),
http://www.bamaed.ua.edu/edtechcases/casestudies/cell%20phones.pdf
(listing studies showing that text messages are the new form of notes passed in a classroom, and have
become the ―latest craze‖ in classroom cheating).
113. See ILANA GERSHORN, THE BREAKUP 2.0: DISCONNECTING OVER NEW MEDIA 23–25
(Cornell Univ. Press, 2010) (ending a relationship through texting is now an acceptable interaction); Eric
R. Merkle & Rhonda Richardson, Digital Dating and Virtual Relating: Conceptualizing Computer
Mediated Romantic Relationships, 49 FAM. REL. J 187, 188–89 (2000) (finding that the initial social
penetration of a new relationship and the process of revealing intimate details and self-disclosure, all of
which are essential to building a new bond, can take place as effectively through instant messaging as it
can through face to face or telephoned communication).
114. See Timeline: Egypt‟s Revolution, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 14, 2011, 3:54 PM), http://english.
aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html; Mike Giglio, The Facebook
Freedom Fighter, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 21, 2011, at 14–16.
115. Wael Ghonim, Wael Ghonim (ghonim) on Twitter, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/Ghonim (last
visited Oct. 24, 2011).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Giglio, supra note 114.
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Text messaging replaces talking. A recent Wall Street Journal study conducted
by Nielsen revealed that the use of text messages is up dramatically while phone
messages are down 25%.119 Americans sent more than two trillion text messages in
2010, and the Pew Internet & American Life Project revealed that teens prefer text
messaging to voice-to-voice communication.120 Another recent study found that
60% of teens do not consider electronic communication to be writing. 121
Take for example the following web transcript of an individual ending a
relationship via instant message (taken from the e-closures breakup blog):
Martin says: (2:40:39 AM) Did you get my email?
Charlotte says: (2:41:16 AM) yeah
Charlotte says: (2:41:38 AM) I wrote you a reply but it‘s ridiculously long and
ill organized
Martin says: (2:41:50 AM) that‘s ok
Martin says: (2:42:25 AM) I‘m sorry I emailed you, I just don‘t know how to
talk to you anymore, I feel like I make you uncomfortable so it just seemed best
Martin says: (2:43:29 AM) like you still have to defend yourself to me, which
is probly my fault, cause I got so frustrated trying to get close to you that I caused
that
Martin says: (2:43:41 AM) that‘s the one thing I forgot to say in the email
Martin says: (2:44:17 AM)I REalize that I caused us to lose trust in each other,
me in your honesty and you in my reaction/thoughts, but it was never really what it
seemed
Charlotte says: (2:44:24 AM) should i send it to you anyways?122
Or the following examples, written by a United States Congressman:

119. Dwight Silverman, Texting is Replacing Talking, Study Says, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER
(Oct. 7, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/business/article/Texting-is-replacing-talking-studysays-891959.php (discussing how a Nielsen study conducted by The Wall Street Journal found that
amongst all age groups‘ time spent talking on cell phones have dramatically dropped while the amount
of text messages sent and received has increased). See also Christina Chang, Texting in Class: It‟s
More Common Than You Think, COLL. NEWS (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.collegenews.com/
index.php?/article/texting_in_class_its_more_common_than_you_think_34262435623/ (citing a Wilkes
University study that found around 92% of all college students text message in class); Yifeng Hu et. al.,
Friendships Through IM: Exploring the Relationship Between Instant Messaging and Intimacy, 10 J.
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1 (Nov. 2004), available at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol10/issue1/hu.html
(demonstrating a strong positive correlation between instant message use and the perceived level of
intimacy between friends).
120. See Texting Skyrockets; Typed Words Replace Talk?, CBS NEWS (Apr. 6, 2011, 12:15 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/04/06/earlyshow/leisure/gamesgadgetsgizmos/main20051303.sht
ml. See also Sachoff, supra note 112.
121. Press Release, Pew Internet and Am. Life Project, Teens Do Not Consider A Lot of Their
Electronic Texts as Writing (Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.pewinternet.org/Press-Releases/2008/Teens-donot-consider-a-lot-of-their-electronic-texts-as-writing.aspx.
122. Case #84:
Charlotte + Martin, E-CLOSURE
(Jan. 25, 2008), http://eclosure.blogspot.com/2008/01/case-84-charlotte-martin.html.
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idiots i work with love this stupid b**ch! i ask them all if they will be turning down
their social security and medicare. . .let‟s kick some gop ass! i hate them!
and
i cat wait to meet you in person! . . . Iunderstand this reelection stuff may take some
time, but i really feel that my needs are waayyy more important! 123
The real time occurrence of each of the above illustrated examples coupled with
their informal nature suggest a communication form that is contrary to the
reflective and edited form of publication that courts contemplated when
establishing the tort of libel. Instead, technospeech is more akin to oral
communication, and for many it is a more efficient way of communicating a
momentary thought.124 The contemporaneousness of instant messaging, as the
communication between Martin and Charlotte reveals, allows individuals to share
thoughts in real time. Twitter communicates an instantaneous call to arms in much
the same way as union leaders with bullhorns or Paul Revere on his horse.
Technospeech lacks the type of formal contemplation and reflection that is the
hallmark of libel.
Speech in the form of technology has become an added mode of
communication.
As early as 1973, Daniel Bell predicted ―major social
consequences would derive from . . . the invention of miniature electronic and
optical circuits capable of speeding the flow of information.‖ 125 Indeed, scores of
theorists and social scientists argue that digital communication is replacing face to
face-dialogue.126 But even the many who reject this displacement theory
acknowledge that technology has provided an outlet for a whole new set of speech,
establishing and reinforcing social norms through new types of language and
dialogue.127 Technospeech does not entirely replace oral communication, but it
123. Transcripts from Facebook Conversations Between Rep. Anthony Wiener and Las Vegas
Black
Jack
Dealer
Lisa
Weiss,
RADAR ONLINE,
http://www.radaronline.com/sites/
radaronline.com/files/Wiener-Facebook-Transcript-Watermarked.pdf (last visited July 2, 2011).
124. See Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 993 A.2d 845, 850 (N.J. Super. 2010), aff'd and
modified, 206 N.J. 209 (2011) (suggesting Internet boards are essentially online forums for
conversation); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49
DUKE L. J. 855, 899 (2000) (explaining message boards promote a looser, more relaxed communication
style, as they lack ―formal rules setting forth who may speak and in what manner, and with what
limitations from the point of view of accuracy and reliability‖).
125. Karen S. Cook et. al., Social Implications of the Internet, 27 ANN. REV. OF SOCIOLOGY 307,
309 (2001), available at http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.307
(summarizing DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL
FORECASTING (Basic Books, 1973)).
126. See Brian Stelter & Jenna Worthman, Watching a Trial on TV, Discussing it on Twitter, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2011, at A14 (quoting Ray Valdes, an analyst with Gartner Research, as saying real-time
reactions to the [Casey Anthony] trial and verdict reflected the gradual adoption of the Web as a primary
mode of communication throughout the day).
127. See Lindsey Langwell et. al., Too Much of a Good Thing? The Relationship Between Number
of Friends and Interpersonal Impressions on Facebook, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 3, 531–49
(2008) (suggesting that digital communication is displacing face to face dialogue). See generally
Amanda J. Lavis, Employers Cannot Get the Message: Text Messaging and Employee Privacy, 54
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does subsume a generous amount of the previously existing sphere of oral dialogue.
Defamatory technospeech blurs libel and slander.128 It therefore demands legal
definition. The next part of this Paper will highlight the compendium of issues that
is raised by the uncertainty of how to characterize defamation by digital
communication.
B. THE PROBLEM WITH CLASSIFYING TECHNOSPEECH
Courts and legislatures confronted with defamatory technospeech will find the
issue one of first impression. Individuals who have brought suits for defamatory
technospeech have settled their claims prior to meeting in court, or have had these
claims involving defamatory tweets dismissed.129 Courts working to resolve this
issue will find that judicial resolution of new technological issues often requires
reliance on ancient common laws.
To date, individuals have filed several cases alleging defamatory
technospeech.130 When filing a complaint, the plaintiffs, like those filing suits
during the early years of broadcasting and the Internet, claimed that defamatory
text messages or tweets were libel and not slander, thereby relieving the plaintiff of
the burden of proving special damages. 131 A majority of these cases have been
VILL. L. REV. 513, 518 (2009); Westlake, supra note 109; Tom Van Riper, Text-Messaging Generation
Entering Workplace, MSNBC (Aug. 30, 2006, 1:50 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ id/14576541/
(discussing changes emerging in workplace behavior between young professionals, coworkers, and
clients caused by availability of new technology).
128. Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 223 (D. Conn. 2009) (asserting that ―[t]oday,
students are connected to each other through email, instant messaging, blogs, social networking sites,
and text messages.‖). A similar debate has evolved regarding whether to treat blog posts as slander or
libel. See Glenn Reynolds, Libel in the Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1157, 1165 (2006) (arguing that treating blog speech as slander would provide a more equitable
outcome since blog speech is more like the spoken word than it is like a newspaper). But see Ciolli,
supra note 13, at 250–51 (2008) (taking issue with Reynolds‘s position).
129. See Jennifer Preston, Courtney Love Settles Twitter Defamation Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2011, at C2; Cynthia Hsu, New Edition‟s Johnny Gill Settles Twitter Lawsuit, FINDLAW (Aug. 26, 2011,
5:44 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/celebrity_justice/2011/08/new-editions-johnny-gill-settles-twitterlawsuit.html; Tanya Roth, A Little Birdie Told Me . . . Twitter Libel Suit Dismissed, FINDLAW (Jan. 27,
2010, 10:15 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/decided/2010/01/a-little-birdie-told-metwitter-libel-suitdismissed.html.
130. A significant number of these cases concern defamatory tweets. See, e.g., Complaint at 5–7,
Simorangkir v. Love, No. BC410593, 2009 WL 798260 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 26, 2009) [hereinafter
Simorangkir Complaint]. See also Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Tosses Libel Suit Filed Against Tenant
for „Moldy Apartment‟ Tweet, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 26 2010 9:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/judge_tosses_libel_suit_filed_against_tenant_for_moldy_apartment_tweet/; Julie Hilden,
Libel by Twitter? The Suit Against Kim Kardashian over the “Cookie Diet”, FINDLAW (Jan. 4 2010),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=/hilden/20100104.html; Sean Yoong, Man
Ordered to Tweet 100 Apologies on Twitter, MSNBC (June 2, 2011 1:26 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.
com/id/43254386/ns/technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/t/man-ordered-tweet-apologies-twitter/
(describing a Malaysian man being ordered [PV] by a judge to apologize 100 times on Twitter for
defaming a magazine publisher).
131. See, e.g., Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs‘ Motion for Summary
Judgment Against Defendant at 4, Am. Satellite v. Hoskins, No. 06CV437, 2007 WL 5129915 (Colo.
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settled before going to trial; however, the rare cases that have gone to trial have left
open the issue of whether text messages or tweets are characterized as libel or
slander.132 In Certainteed Corp. v. Garcia, for example, the trial court noted that
―non-commercial speech, whether on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube or the roofing
blog, [is] clearly subject to allegations of . . . slander or libel . . . .‖133 In American
Satellite v. Hoskins, a trial court judge assumed without deciding that text messages
constituted libel not slander.134
The problem of keeping up with technology is not particular to defamation and
digital communication. In Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
noted, ―courts have struggled to analyze problems involving modern technology
. . . often with unsatisfying results.‖ 135 Currently, scholars and courts note the
disarray of case law in response to technological advances concerning electronic
surveillance, copyright law, trademark law and e-discovery, to name a few.136 In

Dist. Ct. Sept. 13, 2007) (treating text messages as libel) [hereinafter Am. Satellite Summary Judgment
Order]. See also Alyssa J. Long, Internet Defamation, TEX. BAR J. (Mar. 2010), at 202, 203, available
at www.texasbar.com/flashdrive/materials/.../InternetDefamation.pdf (citing Verified Complaint at 2,
Horizon Grp. Mgmt., LLC v. Bonnen, No. 2009L008675 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jul. 20. 2009) and Memorandum
of Law in Support of 2-165 Motion to Dismiss at 6, Horizon Grp. Mgmt., LLC v. Bonnen, No.
2009L008675 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jul. 20. 2009)). In 2009, Amanda Bonnen, then a tenant at a Horizon Realty
Group apartment in Chicago, Ill., composed the following Tweet: ―@JessB123 You should just come
anyway. Who said sleeping in a moldy apartment was bad for you? Horizon realty thinks it's ok.‖ At the
time of the Tweet, Bonnen had only 20 followers. However, the multiple Tweets on her Twitter site
were public. Horizon Realty Group sued Bonnen claiming that the alleged defamatory statement
damaged its business reputation as a Chicago landlord. Before reaching the decision of whether the
comments should be treated as libel or slander—which would require Horizon to prove that the
comments did, in fact, affect their business—a Cook County judge granted Bonnen‘s motion to dismiss.
arguably agreeing with Ms. Bonnen‘s assertion that the ―statement was made in a social context where
the average reader would understand that the statement was Bonnen's opinion, not an objectively
verifiable fact.‖); Simorangkir Complaint supra note 130, at 5–7 (alleging that Courtney Love was liable
for libel due to defamatory messages Love wrote about Simorangkir on Twitter); Joshua Auriemma,
Courtney Love Sued for Tweeting, LEGAL GEEKERY (Mar. 30, 2009), http://
legalgeekery.com/2009/03/30/Courtney-love-sued-for-tweeting/ (stating that Simorangkir maintains the
Tweets were in response to a claim that Love did not compensate her for requested clothing); Courtney
Love Settles Twitter Defamation Lawsuit for $430,000, with Designer Dawn Simorangkir, NY DAILY
NEWS (Mar. 4, 2011), available at http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-03-04/gossip/28673744_1
_twitter-posts-dawn-simorangkir-twitter-account (stating that Love settled for $430,000 out of court);
Hilden, supra note 130.
132. See generally Response to Certainteed Motion for a Finding of Contempt at 11, Certainteed
Corp v. Garcia, No. C09-563RAJ, 2010 WL 4652700 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2010) [hereinafter
Response to Certainteed Motion]; Am. Satellite Summary Judgment Order, supra note 131, at 3–4.
133. Response to Certainteed Motion, supra note 132, at 3.
134. See Am. Satellite Summary Judgment Order, supra note 131.
135. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting the
electronic surveillance statute).
136. Id. See Brett White, Viacom v. Youtube: A Proving Ground for DMCA Harbors Against
Secondary Liability, 24 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 811, 834, 843 (2010). See generally Viacom v.
Youtube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Steven Behnken, Use and Sale of Trademarks
in Interned Applications, J. OF THE DUPAGE CNTY BAR ASS‘N (DCBA BRIEF), Oct. 2009, at 26, 28,
available at http://www.dcbabrief.org/vol221009art3.html. See also Daniel B. Garrie et al., Mobile
Messaging Making E-Discovery Messy: Mobile Messaging and Electronic Discovery, 32 HASTINGS
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some instances, the inconsistency exists among the fifty states. In Raftopol v.
Ramey, the Connecticut Supreme Court cited a fifty state survey that revealed that
the law regarding reproductive technology in ―the vast majority of the states‖ had
failed to deal with the now all too common issue of whether, when and how
surrogacy agreements are enforceable.137
Given the lack of available precedent for cyberspace tort actions and the
conflicting nature of the cases that exist, parties and courts have tried to use
traditional common law torts in novel ways, including application by analogy to
assault, common law invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.138 California courts applied the brick-and-mortar tort of trespass to
chattels to resolve a cyberspace wrong. 139 In Intel Corp v. Hamidi, the California
Court considered Intel‘s motion for a permanent injunction against a disgruntled
former Intel employee who sent mass e-mails to thousands of Intel employees,
allegedly flooding the company‘s e-mail system.140 The trial court, relying on the
theory of trespass to chattels, permanently prohibited the defendant from sending
unsolicited e-mails to the company‘s employees, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.141
In Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, a California Appellate Court addressed the issue
of whether trespass to chattels was an appropriate tort remedy to ensure protecting
computer networks from unauthorized access or use by third parties. 142 Myron and
Susan Bezenek‘s son used the family computer to hack into Thrifty-Tel‘s
system.143 Bezenek accessed the local telephone company‘s network over six to
seven hours.144 Thrifty-Tel introduced a slight amount of evidence, showing that its
system was ―overburdened . . . denying some subscribers access to phone lines‖

COMM. & ENT. L.J. 103, 108 (2009) (―The digital age and the use of the mobile and analogous
technologies has muddled the legal distinctions that used to guide the courts, rendering the rules of ediscovery confusing to administer.‖).
137. Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 785 (Conn. 2011) (citing Dara Hofman, Mama‟s Baby,
Daddy‟s Maybe: A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Law and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 454 (2009)).
138. See Asis Internet Servs. v. Azoogle.com, 357 F. App‘x 112, 113 (9th Cir. 2009) (claiming
spam and emails were an assault on plaintiff under the Controlling the Assault of NonSolicited
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (―CAN–SPAM‖), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701); Deering v. CenturyTel
Broadband Servs., No. CV–10–63–BLG–RFC, 2011 WL 1842859, at *1 (D. Mont. May 16, 2011);
Marquez v. Reyes, No. 10-cv-01281-BNB, 2010 WL 2364435, at *1 (D. Colo. June 10, 2010) (alleging
assault by the Internet where information sent through the Internet served as a weapon to harm plaintiff).
See also Order at 1, 4–5, Schlein v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of Neb., No. 575 111, 1999 WL 34995572
(Neb. Dist. Ct. Feb. 17, 1999); Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMs and E-Mails: Can
a Disparaged Doctrine Be Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 21 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. &
POL‘Y 1, 23, 45 (2010) (looking for common law crimes available to punish cyberharms).
139. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 299 (Cal. 2003).
140. Id. at 301.
141. Id. at 300 (reversing the rulings of the lower courts because Intel failed to show actual
damages in terms of impairment to its server, a necessary element of trespass to chattels).
142. Thrifty-Tel v. Beznek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559 (1996).
143. Id. at 1563.
144. Id. at 1564.
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during the short period of time.145 The Court found defendants liable for trespass
to chattels solely because their son gained unauthorized accessed to the ThriftyTel‟s computer network.146
Intel illustrates the problem of applying traditional common law torts to modern
technology wrongs. The Intel Appellate Court, by using a novel approach of
applying a centuries old tort to a new age crime, tried to fit a square peg into a
round hole. To the extent that in this case proof of trespass to chattels requires the
plaintiff to show that the defendant‘s intentional conduct interfered with Intel‘s use,
the plaintiff failed to prove his claim. 147 As in this example, courts continue to
apply trespass to chattels to cases of Internet hacking and spam. 148
In applying trespass to chattels to cases such as Intel and Thrifty-Tel, the courts
are essentially reworking the traditional tort to fit a new wrong. At common law,
trespass to chattels protected a property owner from intentional interference with
his or her use and enjoyment of the property. 149 E-mail spam, however, does not
prevent a computer user from enjoying his or her screen, and Intel did not
demonstrate that the influx of mass e-mails caused a drain on Intel‘s system. 150
Perhaps Intel would have been better off using the traditional tort of nuisance,
which is satisfied upon proof of unreasonable annoyance, to demonstrate the
requisite harm.151 Indeed, such is also applicable in Thrifty-Tel, where the Court
found only the slightest evidence of harm. 152 Nevertheless, the cases that follow
Intel and Thrifty-Tel have slowly eroded the law of trespass to chattel. 153 Each
successive ruling has found defendants liable on no more evidence than some slight
interference with the plaintiff‘s computer network, thereby reconfiguring the old
tort to look like something entirely different. 154 Richard Epstein, is critical of the
application of an archaic law to a technological problem. 155 Regarding the use of
trespass to chattels for Internet torts, Epstein asks ―whether the hoary rules of
trespass to chattels should apply to [cybertrespass] in light of the functional
145. Id. (explaining that Thrifty-Tel ―presented no evidence of actual losses‖).
146. Id. at 1566.
147. See Adam Mossoff, Spam—Oy, What a Nuisance, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 625, 643–46
(explaining the reasons for Intel‘s failure to prove trespass and arguing that a better approach would
have been for Intel to argue nuisance).
148. See Sch. of Visual Arts v. Kuprewicz, 771 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (2003); Atl. Recording Corp. v.
Serrano, No. 07-CV-1824 W(JMA), 2007 WL 4612921, at *1, *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 28 2007).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. i (1965).
150. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003).
151. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 822 (1938); see also Mossoff, supra, note 147, at 643–
646 (explaining how and why nuisance would have been a more suitable tort for the Intel case).
152. See Thrifty-Tel v. Beznek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1564 (1996).
153. See generally Sch. of Visual Arts, 771 N.Y.S.2d 804; Atl. Recording Corp., 2007 WL
4612921, at *1, *4.
154. See, e.g., CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (awarding an injunction solely on the basis of CompuServe‘s assertion that the spammer's use of
disk space and processing power showed that ―the value of that equipment to CompuServe is diminished
even though it is not physically damaged by defendants' conduct‖).
155. See Richard A. Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi: The Role of Self-Help in Cyberspace?, 1 J.L. ECON.
& POL‘Y. 147, 147 (2005).
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differences between a dog‘s ear and the Internet.‖156
Where defamation is concerned, judicial reliance on previously decided case law
has produced ―an erratic and anomalous development‖ of the law. 157 Courts first
divided defamation into libel and slander following Johannes Guttenberg‘s
Fourteenth Century invention of the printing press. 158 To be sure, some
technological advances drive uniformity in the law. The judicial response to
Internet defamation is one such example. 159 However, jurisdictions vary in their
classification of defamatory broadcast speech.160 American jurisprudence does not
demand uniformity and indeed, where defamation is concerned, states have the
right to regulate the law as they see fit. 161 The libel/slander distinction, however—
particularly as it applies to emerging technology—creates an undue burden on
parties and results in confusion in the courts.
Characterizing technospeech is a costly and time-consuming proposition. When
a type of communication has not yet been characterized as libel or slander,
plaintiffs generally plead libel to avoid the extra requirement of special damages. 162
Defendants respond with a failure to state a claim motion, since, in their view, the
statement, if defamatory at all, should be characterized as slander. 163 Judiciaries
presented with issues concerning new technology are often at a loss for available or
appropriate guiding precedent, and are therefore forced to consider ancient torts to
provide remedies to modern wrongs. 164 In each instance, the result can be
unnecessary, costly and confusing. Judicial or legislative characterization of
technospeech as either libel or slander will prevent unnecessary delays and judicial
wrangling between parties.
C. THE PRACTICAL MANDATE FOR TECHNOSPEECH: A CALL FOR LIBEL
The issue of how to characterize technospeech remains fertile, and even the
Supreme Court has hinted at its reluctance to tackle the thorny issue that no court

156. Id. at 159.
157. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 82.
158. See Gaynes v. Allen, 339 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (explaining the varying
reactions among jurisdictions to Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
159. See Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). See also
Chart infra pp. 52–55.
160. See Chart infra pp. 52–55.
161. See Senna v. Florimont, 958 A.2d 427, 441 (N.J. 2008) (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985)) (―[T]he role of the First Amendment in regulating
state defamation law is more limited when ‗speech [touches] on matters of purely private concern.‘‖).
162. See Shor v. Billingsley, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476 (App. Div. 1957) (determining whether unscripted
broadcasts were libel or slander). See generally Varian Med. Sys., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325 (defendants
alleged that Internet postings must be classified as slander); Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 993 A.2d
845 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (defendant alleged that the only potential harm lay in slander per
se).
163. See Shor, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 477. See also Too Much Media, 993 A.2d at 846.
164. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 299 (Cal. 2003) (using the theory of trespass to
analyze spam).
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has yet to resolve.165 Technospeech‘s combination of the qualities courts find in
slander and libel make it difficult to assign to one type of defamation as opposed to
another. The issue requires courts to balance the transient nature of technospeech
against its ―representation to the eye.‖ 166
Characterizing technospeech as either libel or slander has significant
consequences to plaintiffs pleading a defamation case. Today, plaintiffs can
successfully prove libel and slander without proof of special damages. 167
Nonslander per se cases, which I term ―pure slander,‖ require proof of economic
harm.168 Labeling technospeech as libel means that it joins the majority of
defamatory subtorts that do not require plaintiffs to show economic harm as a
consequence of defamatory speech.
The hybrid quality of defamatory technospeech makes it somewhat difficult to
categorize. Technospeech is often fleeting; appearing briefly on a blog, website or
phone screen and flying off into cyberspace just as promptly. Charlotte and
Martin‘s text messages were most likely promptly erased. 169 Twitter feeds change
within seconds, each new post pushing an old post further back into cyberspace.170
Technospeech, which is contemporaneous speech, is often not reflective. The
evanescent nature of technospeech, coupled with its lack of deliberation and
premeditation, arguably place it squarely in the category of pure slander. However,
technospeech always appears as a firm and fixed medium. Its visual appearance
makes it more capable of permanence and widespread dissemination, which are
features of libel.
Courts, when faced with deciding whether communications made in a fleeting
and easily deleted way were libel or slander, shoved the questioned defamation into
the libel box. In Varian Medical Systems, the Court, over the defendant‘s
objections, found that, while Internet posts can be easily deleted and modified, they
are still much more fixed than the spoken word.171 Electronic writings, the Court
held, are identical to those created by pen and paper.172 The notion of fixation
seemed to tip the balance in favor of labeling the speech as libel. 173 In Too Much
Media, LLC, the Court relied heavily on the capabilities of the dissemination to
reach a wide audience.174 The Shor Court also concluded that widespread
165. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (noting that the earlier
cases dealing with print and broadcast media, where First Amendment issues are concerned, should not
govern the Internet as now, with the Internet, ―anyone with a phone line can become [both] town crier…
[and] pamphleteer‖).
166. Varian Med. Sys., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 341, 343.
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 cmt. a (1977).
168. See id. § 575.
169. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
170. About Twitter, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). See also
Discover More About #newtwitter, YOUTUBE (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=NshQFrpC2O4.
171. Varian Med. Sys., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 343.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. Too Much Media, 993 A.2d at 865.
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dissemination placed defamatory broadcasts on the side of libel, even though the
content in question was incapable of appearing in print. 175
Tweets, text messages and speech-to-text also maintain the durable and fixed
nature of traditional common law libel.176 Every tweet appears on the Twitter
website. Publication, therefore, is identical to any other Internet posting. So, too,
are blog posts, all of which can be printed and distributed. Text and instant
messages can be similarly viewed. Unlike tweets or other messages in the
blogosphere, short message services do not appear on computers. One argument in
favor of characterizing text messages as slander (i.e., a form of oral
communication) is that they only appear on another‘s phone and are customarily
deleted within minutes if not a short time thereafter. 177 But recent technological
advances make it possible to publish text messages, or to email them to friends,
thereby relieving them of the ephemeral or fleeting qualities that remain unique to
pure slander.178
Technology for the newest forms of digital communication assures that
communications can appear in printed form. Speech-to-text renders the keyboard
irrelevant by converting spoken words into text on a computer screen. 179 Although
involving speech, courts resolving defamatory comments that derive from speechto-text technology are less likely to be troubled by labeling them libel since once
appearing in text, these comments can be edited and reflected upon. More
problematic, however, is Skype, a software program that allows individuals to
make phone calls through the use of the Internet. 180 To put it simply, Skype is a
phone call through the Internet. As such, it really is pure speech, and defamatory
remarks made through Skype are fleeting and ephemeral. However, when
combined with speech-to-text technology, Skype conversations can be reduced to
writing, making them both permanent in form and capable of dissemination, the
qualities upon which courts based their decisions when characterizing defamatory
words.181

175. Shor v. Billingsley, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476, 482 (App. Div. 1957).
176. There is, however, some question in the blogosphere as to whether one can defame another in
140 characters.
177. However, Droids, iPhones and other syncable devices are capable of storing entire
conversations on a hard drive making information available for future reference.
178. There are many websites that instruct cellular phone users how to print text messages. See,
e.g., Printing Texts, SAP HELP PORTAL, http://help.sap.com/saphelp_40b/helpdata/pt/d6/
0db80d494511d182b70000e829fbfe/content.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2011); How to Print Texts from an
iPhone, LENA SHORE, http://www.lenashore.com/2010/08/how-to-print-texts-from-an-iphone/ (last
visited Oct. 24, 2011). It has become increasingly common for websites to capitalize on the ability to
print text messages by creating ―archives‖ of text messages that are submitted by willing participants.
See, e.g., TEXTS FROM LAST NIGHT, http://textsfromlastnight.com/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
179. James A. Martin, From Speech to Text, PCWORLD (October 7, 2010, 1:00 AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/138262/from_speech_to_text.html.
180. Call Mobiles and Landlines—Cheap Calls, SKYPE, http://www.skype.com/intl/enus/features/allfeatures/call-phones-and-mobiles/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
181. Shor v. Billingsley, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476, 481 (App. Div. 1957). (describing permanency in
form as the reasoning behind libel/slander distinction). See also supra notes 74–77 and accompanying
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Given its susceptibility for easy distribution, it seems rational to characterize
technospeech as libel. If courts adopt this position, plaintiffs claiming defamation
through electronic communication would be exempt from fulfilling the additional
requirement of pleading special damages. 182 Such a decision is not without
implication. The next Section will consider the consequences of defamation in a
world in which communication that looks like speech is labeled libel.
III. THE DEATH OF SLANDER
Technology has killed slander. This Part advances three arguments in support of
my contention. Part A illustrates how technospeech renders slander historically
irrelevant. Part B highlights how contemporary methods of communication dilute
the presence of slander in American jurisprudence, leaving little justification for
maintaining a subtort that causes confusion to parties and courts. Part C
demonstrates how, given the presence of technospeech, principles of fairness
support abolishing the libel/slander distinction, thereby assuring that credible
plaintiffs are able to rehabilitate their damaged reputations.
Maintaining the subtort of pure slander in the Twitter Age, with its requirement
of proof of economic harm, vitiates the common law purpose of defamation.
Moreover, technospeech creates a further blurring of the law of defamation,
perpetuating the kind of uncertainty and unpredictability that courts and scholars
cite as support for abolishing the libel/slander distinction.183 A thoughtful and
orderly treatment of technospeech mandates that courts and legislatures put the
proverbial final nail in the coffin of slander.
A. IRRELEVANCE
The libel/slander distinction rests on a historical reality that, given present forms
of communication, no longer exists. The printing press, which first appeared
around the Fourteenth Century, prompted courts to divide defamation into two
separate torts.184 During the reign of King Henry VIII, courts recognized that the
text.
182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (1977).
183. See, e.g., Nazeri v. Missouri Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Mo. 1993) (libel per quod
―[adds] to the confusion‖ of libel law); Gibson v. Kincaid, 221 N.E.2d 834, 842 (Ind. App. 1966) (the
libel per se/libel per quod distinction has ―been used, abused misused and confused‖); Protic v. Dengler,
46 F. Supp. 2d 277, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (the use of the terminology libel per quod ―arguably is more
confusing than helpful‖). See also Stanley S. Arkin & Luther A. Granquist, The Presumption of General
Damages in the Law of Constitutional Libel, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1483 n.9 (1968) (noting
―confusion regarding libel per se and libel per quod‖); Conviser, supra note 14, at 2–3 (acknowledging
the confusing nature of libel per quod); M. Linda Dragas, Curing a Bad Reputation: Reforming
Defamation Law, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 113, 115 (1995) (libel laws are arbitrary and confusing).
184. See supra notes 59–61; Van Vechten Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3
COLUM. L. REV. 546, 547 (1903) (“When, at length, early in the seventeenth century, the potentialities
of the printing press dawned upon the absolute monarchy, the emergency was met, not by further
additions to the list of actionable imputations, but by a direct importation of the Roman law . . . . This
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written word, given its permanency in form and ability for widespread
dissemination, was a much greater threat to reputational harm than was the spoken
word, which carried only so far as one‘s natural voice permitted. 185 The potential
for fairly limited harm that slander might impose supported judicial requirements
for proof of special damages. After all, with slander, the words were understood to
be so fleeting that plaintiffs could only present hearsay-type evidence to establish
their existence.
In the 1940s and 1950s, broadcast defamation challenged the traditional
classifications of libel and slander.186 Ad libbed defamation over broadcast airways
was evanescent. It lacked permanency in form, yet it was capable of widespread
dissemination. Courts and legislatures diverged in their response to broadcast
journalism.187 Those that followed Shor v. Billingsly found that widespread
dissemination tipped the balance in favor of characterizing the defamatory speech
as libel.188 Other jurisdictions believed that the fleeting nature of the speech was
sufficient for maintaining the more burdensome requirement of proof of special
damages.189
That different jurisdictions took oppositional approaches to characterizing
defamatory broadcasts is not surprising. Broadcasts presented courts, for the first
time, with a type of communication that was neither exclusively written nor
exclusively spoken.190 Faced with placing broadcast defamation into one of two
categories, courts were forced to pick a side.
Technospeech presents courts with the same quandary, since it significantly
blurs the hallmarks of libel and slander. Text messages and tweets appear in
written durable textual forms. They can be read by many and disseminated with
ease. However, text messages are typically quickly deleted, and tweets disappear
into cyberspace, often at breakneck speed. The nature of these communications
renders them ―soon forgotten and therefore less likely to injure.‖ 191 The casual

special provision for written or printed defamation, first adopted in the criminal law, eventually became
also a principle of civil judicature.‖); Adam Freedman, What‟s the Difference Between Libel and
Slander, LEGAL LAD (MAR. 12 2011), http://legallad.quickanddirtytips.com/whats-the-differencebetween-libel-and-slander.aspx (―Libel, which comes from the Latin libellus, or ‗little book,‘ came into
fashion with the advent of the printing press.‖). See also Whitmore v. Kansas City Star Co., 499 S.W.2d
45, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (―Slander, since the time of Adam and Eve, together with libel since Johann
Gutenberg invested the printing press, have met in head on confrontation with mankind's inherent belief
in freedom of oral and written expression.‖).
185. See Veeder supra note 184.
186. See, e.g., Am. Broad.-Paramount Theatres v. Simpson, 126 S.E.2d 873, 878 (Ga. Ct. App.
1962) (questioning the State Court‘s ability to address broadcast defamation with a new characterization
of the tort).
187. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §46 (West 2007). But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:47 (2007)
(Louisiana has simplified how to treat a defamatory broadcast over radio or television by eliminating the
distinction between the two torts.). See also Chart infra pp. 52–55.
188. See, e.g., Gearhart v. Wsaz, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 98, 112 (E.D. Ky. 1957).
189. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
190. See discussion supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying quotes and text.
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verbal style of text and instant messages ―lack[s] the contemplative and deliberate
maliciousness that is likely to injure.‖192
Given the nature of how we communicate today, the law would be best served
by dispensing with the requirement of proving special damages, an element of
slander, for defamatory technospeech. The Star Chamber first imposed the
requirement of special damages because of the sense that harm cannot come from
the spoken word because it is so transient. 193 In contrast, despite its evanescent
nature, defamatory technospeech is capable of significant harm. Indeed, society is
replete with examples of harm caused by textual communications.194 Courtney
Love‘s tweet caused Dawn Simorangkir‘s reputation and business to suffer. 195
Horizon Realty sued over a tweet from its tenant presumably out of fear that people
would no longer rent from them. 196 Today‘s technology—whether it takes the form
of broadcast airwaves or cellular phones—gives strength to transient comments.
Consequently, the notion of a spoken or fleeting statement‘s inability to harm is no
longer an absolute.
Instances of slander still occur and abolishing slander wholesale is not without
consequence.197 Combining slander with the tort of libel would negate the original
intent behind requiring proof of special damages for slander cases. Relieving
slander plaintiffs of this burden could leave courts sifting through cases where the
transient nature of the defamatory comment causes the type of minimal harm that
the framers of slander intended to avoid. However, retaining slander, while treating
similar transient defamatory text messages and tweets as libel, is uneven at best and
unfair at worst. It suggests that the defendant who speaks through a megaphone is
free from liability absent proof of special damages, while the defendant who text
messages one person may be responsible for the same defamatory content even if
he or she fails to cause economic harm. The contemporary irrelevance of
defamation‘s historic underpinnings coupled with the current uneven state of
defamation law supports a normative rationale for consolidating libel and slander.

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
Slander
Libel

See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying quotes and text.
See supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 129–131 and accompanying text.
See supra at notes 129–31.
See supra at note 129–31.
TRIAL COURT ORDERS
1900–1910
1940–1950
1990–2000
120
197
654
276
402
628

2000–2010
174
139

CASES
Slander
Libel

1900–1910
511
612

1940–1950
462
1,015

Original research conducted through Westlaw Database.

1990–2000
1,292
549

2000–2010
1,398
507
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B. DILUTION
Technospeech is driving slander out of existence. The schism between libel and
slander grew from the notion that victims of slander were less deserving of damage
awards than victims of libel since the slanderous statements were fleeting and less
capable of harm.198 The lack of potential for greater harm in slander cases meant
that plaintiffs were forced to prove special damages: a showing of economic harm
that stemmed from the defamatory comments. 199 Courts abolished the requirement
of proving special damages when they deemed that defamation was slander per
se.200 But the requirement to prove special damages remained for the limited
number of cases that did not fall into the libel or slander per se categories. 201 This
relative difference between pure slander and libel is in some instances completely
perverse since, under the traditional libel/slander distinction, ―a letter read by one
person [is] much more harmful than a speech heard by a thousand.‖ 202
For decades, scholars, judges and commentators have called upon decision
makers to take the reins of the twisted ropes of libel and slander and merge them
into the single tort of defamation.203 In 1966, Professor Laurence Eldredge led the
group advocating for the consolidation of defamatory subtorts.204 Others have
followed suit arguing that America‘s present defamation regime is costly,
confusing and misused.205 Reporters for the Restatement (Second), in the historical
notes, acknowledge that the presence of constantly changing technology demands
abolition of the libel/slander distinction. 206
American jurisdictions have responded to critics in varying ways. 207 Some
jurisdictions have abolished the libel/slander distinction wholesale, eliminating the
need to prove special damages in any instance.208 Other states have toyed with the

198. See generally Ciolli, supra note 13.
199. See Manno v. Am. Gen. Fin. Co., 439 F. Supp. 2d 418, 434 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (citing Dougherty
v. Boyertown Times, 547 A.2d 778, 782 (Pa. 1988)).
200. See Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225, 236 (1876).
201. See supra notes 24–26.
202. Ciolli, supra note 13, at 143 (quoting JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 375
(3d ed. 2007)).
203. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
204. See Eldredge, Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, supra note 13.
205. See Sipe, supra note 13, at 144–45, 148–53; James Windon, Fee Shifting in Libel Litigation:
How the American Approach to Costs Allocation Inhibits the Achievement of Libel Law‟s Substantive
Goals, 3 J. INTL. MEDIA & ENT. L. 175 (2010). See also Mark Franklin, The Origins and
Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 806–16, 836–
48 (1964); Kathryn Dix Sowle, A Matter of Opinion: Milkovich Four Years Later, 3 WM. & MARY
BILL. RTS. J. 467, 499–550 (1994).
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 cmt. b (1977) (―With the discovery of new
methods of communication, many courts have condemned the distinction as harsh and unjust. This
anomalous and unique distinction is in fact a survival of historical exigencies in the development of the
common law jurisdiction over defamation.‖).
207. See Chart infra pp. 52–55 (identifying each jurisdiction‘s treatment of defamation, including
legislative and judicial responses to criminal defamation and broadcast defamation).
208. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:47 (combining oral and written defamation into one tort);
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libel/slander distinction where broadcast defamation is concerned, labeling all
broadcast defamation as either slander or libel. 209 The State of Georgia created a
separate tort, called defamacast.210 And while most states retain the libel/slander
distinction, many have called into question the validity of having two separate torts
for the same type of wrong. 211
To date, no state court has passed on the issue of whether text messages or
tweets should be characterized as libel or slander.212 Much like the nationwide
reaction to broadcast defamation, jurisdictions presented with the hybrid nature of
defamatory technospeech could characterize the speech as each sees fit, defining it
as either libel or as slander. Jurisdictions, however, also have a third option: They
can create a separate category of defamation for technospeech, much like Georgia
did for defamatory broadcasts. Courts and/or legislatures choosing this option
could designate all technospeech as libel given that it appears in a permanent,
textual form and could also require plaintiffs to prove special damages, since this

Shupe v. Rose‘s Store, 192 S.E.2d 766, 767 (Va. 1972) (treating libel and slander as one tort of
defamation); Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 221 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) (abolishing
the distinction between libel and slander). See also Newberry v. Allied Stores, Inc., 773 P.2d 1231,
1236 (N.M. 1989) (noting ―there are good reasons for abolishing the distinction between libel and
slander‖ (quoting Reed v. Melnick, 471 P.2d 178, 182 (N.M. 1970))); Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 7,
35, 37 (Austl.) (abolishing the common law distinction between libel and slander and removing
requirement of proof of special damages).
209. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 46 (West 1996) (stating that slander encompasses all defamation by
radio); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:47 (explaining how Louisiana has simplified how to treat a
defamatory broadcast over radio or television by eliminating the distinction between the two torts);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2911(8) (West 2011) (explaining libel encompasses all radio and
televised broadcasts); Metcalf v. KFOR-TV, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Okla. 1992) (analyzing
defamation suit under slander, regardless of there being a script). See also Gray v. Wala-TV, 384 So. 2d
1062, 1065 (Ala. 1980) (discussing whether, read from a manuscript or not, broadcast defamatory
language is libel); Greer v. Skyway Broad. Co., 142 S.E.2d 98, 103–04 (N.C. 1962) (explaining
distinctions between libel and slander held inapplicable to radio and televised broadcasts); Niehoff v.
Cong. Square Hotel Co., 103 A.2d 219, 220 (Me. 1954) (drawing no distinction between libel and
slander, broadcast statements treated the same); Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A.2d 143, 144 (N.J. 1948)
(holding defamatory words broadcast are actionable without regard to whether they are spoken or
written and do not require proof of special damages); Matherson v. Marchello, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1004
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (explaining all defamation that is broadcast should be classified as libel).
210. Am. Broad.-Paramount Theatres Inc. v. Simpson, 126 S.E.2d 873, 879 (Ga. App. 1962)
(listing ―defamacast‖ as the only classification of defamatory words spoken over the radio or television).
211. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 347 (1974) (―[S]o long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.‖). See also Stringer
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781, 793 (Ky. 2004) (recognizing that even though there are two
separate torts—libel for written communications and slander for oral—the essence of the two is the
same: damage to one‘s reputation); Grein v. La Poma, 340 P.2d 766, 767 (Wash. 1959) (en banc)
(calling into question the preservation of the libel/slander distinction based on the English history of the
question in the 19th century as to whether the distinction should be abolished); Boyles v. Mid-Florida
Television Corp., 431 So.2d 627, 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), approved, 467 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1985)
(recognizing the element of innuendo still exists for private individuals even though Gertz abolished one
distinction between libel per se and libel per quod).
212. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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speech is fleeting and not contemplated or edited.213 Requiring special damages in
this instance would assure that the defamatory technospeech actually caused the
type of harm that is worthy of civil damage awards.
Courts labeling technospeech as libel, while requiring plaintiffs to prove special
damages, would be treating the wrong in a manner similar to the subtort of libel per
quod. Courts created and adopted libel per quod based on the theory that
defendants should not be called to answer for their statement unless the plaintiff
was able to prove that the statement caused pecuniary harm. This theory rests on
the presumption that a particular statement, which is not defamatory on its face,
offers the potential for minimal harm, if none at all. 214 The issue on the merits of
libel per se—libel that does not require proof of special damages and libel per
quod—led to great debate and, in fact, Dean Prosser and Professor Eldredge
dedicated significant scholarship to the value of libel per quod (Prosser arguing its
value; Eldredge disagreeing). 215 The debate over the value of libel per quod
remains today.216 And several states have refused to distinguish between these two
subtorts.217 No doubt creating a new subtort of defamatory technospeech would
lead to similar debate.
Creating a subtort of defamatory technospeech would accomplish the benefits
associated with proof of special damages, such as assuring the speech in question is
that of a redressable wrong and preventing plaintiffs from filing law suits absent
some reflection on the damage done. However, the benefits are obfuscated when
weighed against the burden of adding another subtort to the defamation lexicon.
Legislative and judicial creation of defamatory subtorts, such as libel per quod and
defamacast, has done little if anything to help navigate the law of defamation.
Muddling the already murky defamation waters by creating a new and novel theory
of defamatory technospeech would serve no purpose other than to saddle a plaintiff
with the requirement of additional proof of harm.
The better view is to recognize that the existence of technospeech supports the
long-standing movement by much of the literature to abrogate the libel/slander
distinction. Consolidating all of defamation into one tort would assure a more
213. See Reynolds, supra note 128, at 1163.
214. See, e.g., Morton v. Hearst Corp., 779 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
215. See Eldredge, Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, supra note 13, at 756 (arguing that the
prevailing view among courts is that all libel claims are actionable without proof of special damages and
that such view should not be altered); Laurence H. Eldredge, Variation on Libel Per Quod, 25 VAND. L.
REV. 79, 79 (1972) (describing libel per quod as a ―spurious rule‖); Prosser, Libel Per Quod, supra note
1, at 847–48 (arguing that the majority of courts distinguish between libel per se and per quod); William
L. Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1629, 1629–30 (1966) (reiterating and explaining
his claim that most jurisdictions had accepted libel per quod). See generally Haven Ward, ―I‟m not Gay,
M‟kay?”: Should Falsely Calling Someone a Homosexual be Defamatory?, 44 GA. L. REV. 739, n. 51
(2010).
216. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
217. See Libel and Slander Per Se vs. Per Quod, DANCING WITH LAWYERS,
http://www.dancingwithlawyers.com/freeinfo/libel-slander-per-se.shtml (last visited Sept. 22, 2011)
(noting that Arizona, Arkansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Oregon and Tennessee do not distinguish
between libel per se and libel per quod).
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streamlined approach to defamation and will preclude confusion and costs to
parties to litigation and to the courts.
The libel/slander distinction creates an undue burden on parties and on the
courts. The continuing dichotomy between written and spoken defamation and the
correct way to treat the ―in between‖ words of technospeech create a constant
interchange between parties during the pleadings stage of the proceedings. The
currently unresolved issue has left parties guessing how to best plead their cases. 218
In almost every instance, plaintiffs pleading defamation will label the speech libel,
in hopes of avoiding the burden of pleading special damages. Defendants, in turn,
often file a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that the speech is indeed
slander, and the plaintiff therefore failed to state a claim.219 This judicial wrangling
results in unnecessary and costly delay. Legislatively labeling technospeech as
libel would assist plaintiffs in pleading their cases and would help defendants
properly respond to the claim.
―Courts have struggled to analyze problems involving modern technology . . .
often with unsatisfying results.‖220 Many have been critical of the Hamidi and
Thrifty-Tel decisions for the misapplication of brick and mortar cases to
technological wrongs.221 Technological innovations continually challenge courts in
ways other than finding applicable precedent. These cases of first impression tie up
judicial time as they seem to yield a disproportionate amount of lengthy appeals
and complex pleadings.222 In Varian Medical Systems., Inc. v. Delfino, the Court
spent over four years debating whether the defamatory Internet postings should be
considered libel or slander. 223 In addition, over two years passed from the time a
lower New York court decided the Shor case and the Appellate Division affirmed
the decision that nonscripted, broadcasted defamation should be treated as libel. 224
Preemptively resolving the distinction between libel and slander would benefit and
streamline the judicial process.
The gradual erosion of pure slander, coupled with the panoply of problems that
accompany its existence, support abolishing pure slander and creating a single tort
of defamation, whereby proof would be similar to proof of libel. Merging libel and
slander would satisfy the need for fairness to parties pleading defamation, and
would alleviate courts of the burden of using brick-and-mortar type cases to resolve
technological issues. It would also allow legislatures to streamline their treatment
of defamatory wrongs. Thus, technospeech, with its host of issues, is actually a
fortuitous development whose emergence serves as the proper catalyst to move
defamation toward necessary consolidation.

218. See generally supra notes 70–104 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 67–103 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 67–103 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 150–57 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 150–57 and accompanying text.
223. Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 341 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
224. See Riss v. Anderson, 304 F.2d 188, 197 (8th Cir. 1966); Shor v. Billingsley, 158 N.Y.S.2d
476, 480–81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957).
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C. FAIRNESS
Though there are two separate torts—libel for written communication and
slander for oral—the gist of the two is the same: ―the injury to the reputation of a
person in public esteem.‖225 Characterizing technospeech as libel will preserve the
right of victims of defamation by digital communication to restore their reputation
without having the burden of proving economic harm. In other words, calling
technospeech libel assures that the tort of defamation by digital communication
reflects the original intent and spirit of this tort.
At its core, defamation is a means to remedy injury to one‘s reputation, and for
that reason defamation should be viewed as a dignitary tort. 226 Dignitary torts are
―injuries to one‘s personality or the dignity one has as a person.‖ 227 While, early
on, dignitary torts were reserved for harm to the actual person, today courts include
defamation in their list of dignitary harms. 228
Dignitary torts permit recovery upon a showing that plaintiff‘s personal dignity
was in some way violated. The ecclesiastical court‘s intent behind the wrong of
defamation was based on the belief that publishing false reports affecting the
integrity of another was morally wrong. 229 Consequently, the ecclesiastical courts
did not originally require proof of special damages for slander. It was only once
the printing press was invented, and libel came into being, that courts considered
injury resulting from an oral communication as somewhat trifling and potentially of
utter disregard.230 Sometime around the mid Eighteenth Century, plaintiffs
pleading slander were required to prove special damages in order to recover for
pure slander.231
Economic torts provide liability for pure economic loss. 232 Plaintiffs are
prevented from recovery absent a showing of specific financial harm. 233 Wrongs

225. Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781, 793 (Ky. 2004).
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 cmts. a–b (1979) (differentiating the types of
damage to reputation allowing the target to recover without showing any other damages from others that
do not allow for recovery without additional economic or pecuniary losses on the forms of defamation
that result in reputational harms).
227. J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Getting Physical: Excluding Personal Injury Awards
Under the New Section 104(a)(2), 58 MONT. L. REV. 167, 179 (1997).
228. Vogt v. Churchill, 679 A.2d 522, 524 (Me. 1996) (noting that defamation is a dignitary tort).
See, e.g., Barrows v. Wiley, 478 F.3d 776, 780 (7th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Harris, No. 08-13328, 2009
WL 3126315, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2009); State v. Corbitt, 82 P.3d 211, 219 (Utah Ct. App.
2003).
229. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
230. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 217
(1890).
231. G. Edward White, A Customary International Law of Torts, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 755, 770
(2006) (citing Blackstone‘s interpretation of libel and slander).
232. See Town of Alma v. Azco Const., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Colo. 2000) (observing that
some torts are expressly designed to remedy pure economic loss). See also Van Sickle Constr. Co. v.
Wachovia Commercial Mortg. Inc., 783 N.W.2d 684, 691–92 (Iowa 2010) (an economic tort allows for
the recovery of economic damages).
233. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B (―[D]amage recoverable for a negligent
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that courts generally label as economic torts include fraud, deceit or negligent
representation.234 In each instance the plaintiff has suffered an injury that results in
harm to his or her financial well-being.
Requiring proof of economic loss for slander is problematic for two reasons.
First, it means that pure spoken defamation is not actionable unless an individual
suffers some type of economic harm. Thus, a police officer failed to recover in
slander even though content was deemed defamatory, since the police officer failed
to show how the defamatory content affected his livelihood. 235 Second, it separates
pure slander from all other defamatory subtorts as the only tort that prohibits an
action for the purposes of either proving in court that the defamatory content was
wrong or for reinstituting one‘s good name.
Much has been made of economic torts and in fact the Restatement (Third) has
been fashioned around the notion that tort law is primarily focused on remedying
plaintiffs for economic loss as a result of a wrongdoer‘s conduct. 236 But in contrast
to most torts, one could argue that defamation is not an economic tort. 237 In fact,
with the exception of pure slander, proof of economic harm is not a prerequisite to
recovery.238 This has prompted at least one scholar to assert that the tort does not
even belong in the Restatement (Third).239
When framed as a dignitary, as opposed to an economic tort, the requirement of
special damages for pure slander is illogical, as it sets that small category of
defamatory conduct apart from the large majority of tortious claims based on the
same type of actionable conduct.240 The artificial divide is irrational, given the
tort‘s original intent, and inappropriate when measured against the backdrop of
traditional defamation law.241
To be sure, there is a large movement, led by Judge Richard Posner, in favor of
reframing tort law exclusively in terms of economic harm. 242 Economic tort
misrepresentation are those necessary to compensate the plaintiff . . . including (a) the difference
between the value of what he has received in the transaction and its purchase price or other value given
for it; and (b) pecuniary loss suffered . . . .‖).
234. See Martinez v. Green, 131 P.3d 492, 494 n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Nelson v.
Progressive Corp., 976 P.2d 859, 867 (Alaska 1999)).
235. See Gomes v. Fried, 186 Cal. Rptr. 605, 615 (Ct. App. 1982).
236. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC LOSS (Preliminary Draft No. 1,
2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECONOMIC TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS (Preliminary
Draft No. 2, 2006).
237. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. See also Vogt v. Churchill, 679 A.2d. 552, 524
(Me. 1996) (noting that defamation is a dignitary tort); Johnson v. Harris, No. 08-13328, 2009 WL
3126315 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2009).
238. See discussion supra notes 31–36.
239. See Anderson, supra note 37, at 1047–48.
240. See generally Dan B. Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 713, 721 (2006).
241. See Anderson, supra note 37, at 1047 (―Defamation is a dignitary tort; attempting to reduce it
to a remedy for economic loss would be historically unfaithful, doctrinally radical, and destructive of
important cultural values.‖).
242. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2000)
(applying economic theories to property, contract and tort law); RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A
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theorists assert that the proper role of tort law is to assure just compensation for
economic harm.243 The use of economic sanctions as a corrective measure, and as
a great equalizer, has sprung up in legal spheres other than tort law. 244
In contrast to Justice Posner, Justice Cardozo emphasized tort law‘s moral
aspect, suggesting that in certain instances, a plaintiff is entitled to have a wrong
redressed for personal reasons. 245 His view echoes that of Blackstone, who
identified a list of personal tort actions, including defamation, designed entirely to
allow ―victims to vindicate one or more of his absolute rights to life, liberty, and
the use of property.‖246 Traditional defamation rules permit a jury to award
nominal damages for libel or slander per se. 247 Allowing nominal damages served
―a vindicatory function by enabling the plaintiff publicly to brand the defamatory
publication as false.‖248 The salutary social value of this rule is preventive in
character since it often permits a defamed person to expose the groundless
character of a defamatory rumor before harm to his reputation has occurred.‖ 249
The requirement of proof of special damages for pure slander makes it an
economic tort. A robust tort regime, however, must take into account noneconomic
harm. Both libel and slander per se acknowledge the need for damages for
something other than economic harm, as each tort allows for nominal damages
upon proof that the defendant defamed the plaintiff and was not otherwise
excused.250 The threshold question in any defamation case is whether the
defendant‘s comment was injurious to the plaintiff‘s reputation. 251 A defamatory
wrong in most instances is actionable absent proof of economic harm. 252 However,
under the doctrine of pure slander, the plaintiff cannot recover damages absent a
showing of economic harm.253 The irony is that once the plaintiff does successfully
prove special damages, he or she is also then entitled to an award of nominal, and

COMPLEX WORLD (1995); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW 14 (1987).
243. See generally supra note 242.
244. Professors Thomas Koenig and Michael Rustad have advocated a different theory for tort,
which they call ―Crimtort.‖ Crimtort advocates using tort law to punish through economic sanctions.
See THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 207 (2001).
245. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Traditional Versus Economic Analysis: Evidence from Cardozo
to Posner Torts Opinions, 62 U. FLA. L. REV. 667, 669, 670, 672, 674 (2010).
246. John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a
Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L. J. 524, 548 (2005).
247. Thayer v. Eastern Maine Med. Ctr., 740 F. Supp. 2d 191, 201 (D. Me. 2010); Johnson v.
Clark, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1254 (M.D. Fla. 2007); Maison de France, Ltd. v. Mais Oui!, Inc., 108
P.3d 787, 794 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
248. Afro-American Publ‘g Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
249. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 765 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 cmt. b (1977)).
250. See discussion supra notes 31–36.
251. See e.g., Socha v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Letter Carriers Branch No. 57, 883 F. Supp. 790, 806 (D.
R.I. 1995) (citing Elias v. Youngken, 493 A.2d 158, 161 (R.I. 1985)).
252. James v. Coors Brewing Co., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1253 (D. Colo. 1999).
253. Tucker v. Fischbein, No. Civ.A.97-6150, 2005 WL 67076, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2005).
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punitive, damages.254
The lack of a proof of economic harm requirement in libel and slander per se
cases is evidence of defamation‘s real role, which is to avenge one‘s tarnished
reputation. Abolishing the libel/slander distinction would mean that a court of law
would be the appropriate forum for any seemingly defamed individual to have his
or her day in court, and potentially avenge an injury to his or her reputation,
regardless of how the defamation was delivered. Granting victims of pure slander
their day in court is consistent with Judge Cardozo‘s view of a just democratic legal
system.
Technospeech, which would fit squarely on the side of libel, means that a very
small subset of defamation requires proof of special damages, and this small subset
is not only inconsistent with the other torts, but is also inconsistent with the notion
that defamation is a dignitary tort. Preserving the libel/slander distinction for the
relatively few pure slander cases of today creates a theoretical divide among the
single tort of defamation. Libel is not, nor is it meant to be, an economic tort.
Neither is slander per se, which exempts the proof of special damages requirement.
Under current law, pure slander, with its requirement of proof of special damages,
remains a distant cousin from the more appropriate pleadings required for libel and
slander per se.
IV. CONCLUSION
Current defamation law hardly benefits anyone. The unforeseen proliferation of
digital communication necessitates an expansion of the hypothesis that the
libel/slander distinction should be abrogated. The confusion and unfair burden that
such a distinction brings to litigants, coupled with the lack of reasonable precedent
and the judicial burden of resolving the issue of whether digital communication is
libel or slander, weigh heavily in favor of abolishing the libel/slander distinction
and allowing for one all encompassing tort of defamation. Given the way we
communicate, it is time for courts and legislatures alike to acknowledge the death
of slander.

254.

Sipe, supra note 13, at 147.
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CHART A
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO DEFAMATION BY JURISDICTIONi

Jurisdiction

Federal
Washington
D.C.
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Mississippi
Montana
Nebraska
New
Hampshire
New Jersey

Civil
Statute
Regulating
Defamation

Abrogate
Libel
Slander
Distinction
By Case
Law or
Statute

Xiv
Xvi

Treat
Scripted
and
Unscripted
Defamatory
Broadcasts
Equally

Criminal
Statute
Criminalizing
Defamation

XXii

Xiii

Xv

Xvii
*viii
Xx
Xxiii

X

xi

Xix
XXxii

Xxiv
xv

X
Xxvi
Xxvii
X

xix

Xxviii
Xxx
Xxxii

Xxxi

Xxxiii
X

xxv

X

xxvi

Xxxix
Xxxxi
Xxxxiii

**xxiv
Xxxvii
Xxxviii
Xxxx
Xxxxii
Xxxxiv

Xxxxv

*xxxvi
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New Mexico
New York
Nevada
North
Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South
Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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*xl

Xxli
Xxlii
Xxliv
Xxlv
Xxlviii
Xl

Xxliii
Xxlvi
Xli

Xliii
Xliv
Xlv
Xlvii
Xlix
Xlxi
Xlxii
Xlxiii
*lxv

Xxlvii
Xxlix
*lii

Xlvi
Xlviii
Xlx

Xlxiv
*lxvi

i. Key:
* Constitution of jurisdiction provides an inferential cause of action
** Jurisdiction has a statute, which allows criminal prosecution of any crime not listed in their criminal
code
X Jurisdiction has a statute or case law for cause of action
XX State has legislation or case law that is currently in conflict
ii. Gray v. Wala-TV, 384 So. 2d 1062, 1065 (Ala. 1980) (whether read from a manuscript or not,
broadcast defamatory language is libel), negative treatment by Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534
So.2d 1085 (Ala. 1988).
iii. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-160 (2011) (criminal libel statute).
iv. CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 2011) (civil cause of action for libel); CAL. CIV. CODE § 46
(West 2011) (civil cause of action for slander).
v. CAL. CIV. CODE § 46 (West 2011) (slander encompasses all defamation by radio).
vi. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-124 (West 2011) (libel and slander pleading requirements).
vii. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3919 (West 2011) (codifies truth as a defense).
viii. Fla. Const. art. I, § 4 (cause of action for civil defamation in constitution).
ix. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 836.01 (West 2011) (criminal libel statute).
x. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-1 (West 2011) (civil cause of action for libel); GA. CODE ANN. § 515-4 (West 2011) (civil cause of action for slander).
xi. Am. Broad.-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 126 S.E.2d 873, 879 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962)
(―defamacast‖ is a special classification for defamatory words spoken over the radio or television).
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xii. H.R. 348, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011) (amending original criminal defamation
law). See generally Williamson v. State, 295 S.E.2d 305 (Ga. 1982) (introducing a new to replace the
former statute, now held to be unconstitutional).
xiii. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 657-4 (LexisNexis 2011) (civil statute of limitations).
xiv. Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 221 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) (―Illinois law,
by evolvement, ha[s] abolished all distinctions between slander and libel except as to whether the
defamation was oral or written.‖).
xv. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-15-1-1 (West 2011) (civil statute for libel or slander).
xvi. IOWA CODE ANN. § 659.1 (West 2011) (pleading requirement).
xvii. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.051 (West 2011) (civil action for libel).
xviii. Gearhart v. WSAZ, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Ky. 1957) (finding all defamatory broadcasts
made over television to be libel rather than slander).
xix. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:47 (2011) (Louisiana has a policy of making oral and written
defamation equally inclusive, by combining the two into a single crime entitled ―defamation‖).
xx. Id.
xxi. Id.
xxii. Niehoff v. Cong. Square Hotel, 103 A.2d 219 (Me. 1954) (finding no distinction between
libel and slander; broadcast statements are treated the same).
xxiii. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-501 (West 2011) (slander defined as applied to
specific circumstances).
xxiv. 32 Mass. Prac., Criminal Law § 534 (3d ed.) (―While there is no statute which defines or
punishes criminal libel, it is a punishable offense.‖). MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 5 (West 2011)
(―If no punishment for a crime is provided by statute, the Court shall impose such sentence, according to
the nature of the crime, as conforms to the common usage and practice in the commonwealth.‖).
xxv. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2911 (West 2011) (cause of action for defamatory (i.e.,
libelous or slanderous) broadcasts).
xxvi. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2911(8) (West 2011) (libel encompasses all radio and
televised broadcasts).
xxvii. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.370 (West 2011) (criminal libel statute).
xxviii. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.22 (West 2011) (criminal statute: indictment); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.765 (West 2011) (criminal statute: elements).
xxix. MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-1-1 (West 2011) (civil defamation).
xxx. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-7-33 (West 2011) (indictment for libel).
xxxi. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-802 (2011) (civil definition of libel); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-803
(2011) (civil definition of slander).
xxxii. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212 (2011) (criminal statute).
xxxiii. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-209 (2011) (cause of action).
xxxiv. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:11 (2011) (criminal statute).
xxxv. Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A.2d 143, 144 (N.J. 1948) (broadcasted defamatory words are
actionable without regard to whether they are spoken or written, and do not require proof of special
damages).
xxxvi. N.J. Const. art. I, § 6 (New Jersey State Constitution provides an inferential criminal cause of
action).
xxxvii. NMRA, Civ. UJI 13-1001 (codified civil jury instructions).
xxxviii. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 76 (McKinney 2011) (evidence for libel).
xxxix. Matherson v. Marchello, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1004 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (holding that all
defamation that is broadcast should be classified as libel).
xl. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 8 (New York State Constitution provides cause of action for criminal
libel).
xli. Greer v. Skyway Broad. Co., 124 S.E.2d 98, 104 (N.C. 1962) (distinctions between libel and
slander held inapplicable to radio and televised broadcasts).
xlii. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-02 (2011) (civil defamation); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-03 (2011)
(civil libel defined); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-04 (2011) (civil slander defined).
xliii. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-01 (2011) (criminal statute).
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xliv. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.01 (West 2011) (cause of action for libel and slander).
xlv. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1441 (West 2011) (libel defined); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1442 (West 2011) (slander defined).
xlvi. Metcalf v. KFOR-TV, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Okla. 1995) (court analyzes defamation
suit under slander, regardless of there being a script).
xlvii. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 771 (West 2011) (criminal libel statute).
xlviii. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.205 (West 2011) (damages recoverable in tort actions for
defamation).
xlix. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135.733 (West 2011) (sufficiency of accusatory instrument in a
criminal action).
l. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343 (West 2011) (burdens of proof in action for defamation).
li. Summit Hotel v. Nat‘l Broad. Co., 8 A.2d 302, 310 (Pa. 1939) (distinction between libel and
slander are not suited for the radio broadcast medium).
lii. Pa. Const. art. I, § 7 (constitution has criminal cause of action).
liii. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-11-2 (2011) (defamation defined); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-11-3
(2011) (libel defined); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-11-4 (2011) (slander defined).
liv. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-24-101 (West 2011) (civil action for words imputing sexual
impropriety).
lv. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2011) (civil libel).
lvi. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 89.101 (West 2011) (criminal statute for slander).
lvii. UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-2-2 (West 2011) (libel and slander defined).
lviii. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-404 (West 2011) (criminal statute for defamation)
lix. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-45 (West 2011) (civil action for words tending to breach the peace).
lx. Shupe v. Rose‘s Store, 192 S.E.2d 766, 767 (Va. 1972) (finding that both libel and slander are
to be treated under Virginia Code as defamatory words).
lxi. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.36.120 (West 2011) (pleading requirements libel and slander).
lxii. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-2 (West 2011) (cause of action for insulting words).
lxiii. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.57 (West 2011) (statute of limitations for civil action).
lxiv. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.01 (West 2011) (criminal statute for defamation).
lxv. Wyo. Const. art. I, § 20 (Wyoming State Constitution has cause of action for civil
defamation).
lxvi. Id. (Wyoming State Constitution has cause of action for criminal defamation).

